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Notes 
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S 
SHORTCOMINGS FOR POLICE DURING 
SCHOOL SHOOTINGS 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On a normal day inside Wilson High School’s Room 110, three dozen 
students talk excitedly of the weekend’s past events as they wait for 
geometry class to begin.1  Suddenly, a frightening, reverberating sound 
comes from the hallway—gunshots.  On this bright Monday morning, 
Billy decided to kill as many of his fellow students as possible for no 
apparent reason.  As he walks through the halls, firing arbitrarily at any 
student in his path, the principal orders the school to initiate lockdown 
procedures and immediately calls the police.  When the police arrive, 
they rush to quarantine the area by establishing a perimeter around the 
school and assist only those students that escaped.  Following 
department procedure, they are forced to sit outside the school for the 
next hour and await the Special Weapons and Tactics (“SWAT”) team’s 
arrival.  As the police wait, they hear the unremitting shots coming from 
inside the school.  After the SWAT team arrives and nearly fifty innocent 
lives are lost, Billy puts the guns down to surrender.  He is arrested and 
eventually sentenced to life in prison. 
While the scenario above is merely fictional, the words “school 
shooting” often arouse strong emotions of fear and anxiety in many 
Americans.2  These same emotions are evoked when mentioning 
Jonesboro, Arkansas; Columbine; Virginia Tech; or Northern Illinois 
University.3  Although school shootings have plagued America for many 
                                                 
1 This scenario is entirely fictional and is not based upon any known true facts.  Any 
resemblance is merely coincidental. 
2 Lesli A. Maxwell, School Shootings in Policy Spotlight:  Safety Experts Say Best Idea is Level 
Heads But Open Eyes, EDUC. WK., Oct. 11, 2006, available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ 
articles/2006/10/11/07shoot.h26.html (noting the anxieties school shootings have created 
for students, their families, school officials, and police). 
3 See generally Timeline of School Shootings, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORTS, Feb. 15, 2008, 
http://www.usnews.com/articles/news/national/2008/02/15/timeline-of-school-
shootings.html?PageNr=1 (summarizing school shootings since 1966).  Additional 
prominent school shootings are as follows:  August 1, 1966, Charles Whitman killed sixteen 
people and wounded thirty-one during a ninety-six-minute shootout from atop the 
observation deck at the University of Texas-Austin; January 17, 1969, two students were 
shot and killed during a student meeting at the University of California-Los Angeles; 
December 30, 1974, Anthony Barbaro killed three adults and wounded eleven others at his 
high school; February 22, 1978, a fifteen-year-old self-proclaimed Nazi killed one student 
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years, they appear to be increasingly regular events in American society, 
or at least more frequently reported by the media.4  To combat such 
shootings, police officers are currently trained to take aggressive steps to 
stop the shooter, including the use of deadly force.5 
In today’s society, police conduct is a controversial topic.6  Although 
police departments encourage the use of less lethal alternatives when 
seizing or arresting suspects, courts often expect officers to refrain from 
using deadly force.7  Consequently, there is a growing gap between 
officer training as it relates to school shootings and judicial expectations 
regarding officer conduct.8 
This Note advocates that the current reasonableness test under the 
Fourth Amendment must be amended to give greater deference to police 
officers with regard to their use of deadly force when responding to 
school shootings, while reducing the frequency of school shootings.  Part 
                                                                                                             
and wounded a second; August 12, 1986, five people are shot and one killed by a student at 
New York Technical College in Brooklyn; November 1, 1991, a graduate student killed five 
and wounded two at the University of Iowa; February 2, 1996, two students and one 
teacher are killed and another wounded when a fourteen-year-old opened fire on his 
algebra class; August 15, 1996, graduate student at San Diego State University killed three 
professors while defending his thesis; December 1, 1997, three students are killed and five 
wounded by a fourteen-year-old student at a high school in Paducah, Kentucky; December 
15, 1997, two students are wounded by a fourteen-year-old who was hiding in the woods 
when he shot the students standing in the parking lot; May 21, 1998, two teenagers are 
killed and twenty wounded in a school shooting in Oregon; March 5, 2001, a fifteen-year-
old student kills two and wounds thirteen in California; January 16, 2002, graduate student 
at Appalachian School of Law killed the dean, a professor, and a student, while wounding 
three; and October 2, 2006, gunman kills six at an Amish schoolhouse in Pennsylvania.  Id. 
4 See Timeline of School Shootings, supra note 3 (summarizing school shootings since 1966 
and the increased frequency of school shootings annually). 
5 See infra Part II.C (discussing changes in police policies and recent tactics police 
departments are training their officers to use). 
6 See J. Michael McGuinness & Melvin L. Tucker, Police Use of Force Standards Under 
Colorado and Federal Law, 36 COLO. LAW. 47, 47 (2007) (“Police officer conduct is among the 
most controversial public interest topics in the country.”). 
7 See Neal Miller, Less-Than-Lethal Force Weaponry:  Law Enforcement and Correctional 
Agency Civil Law Liability for the Use of Excessive Force, 28 CREIGHTON L. REV. 733, 735 (1995) 
(“One of the more innovative reforms is to increase the use of the less-than-lethal force 
weapon (“LTL”) among police officers in order to limit resource to either deadly force or 
injury-producing conventional force instruments.”).  See also infra Part II.B (discussing the 
reasonableness test set forth by the Supreme Court and the expectation that officers use 
deadly force in limited circumstances). 
8 See Alissa C. Wetzel, Comment, Georgia v. Randolph:  A Jealously Guarded Exception—
Consent and the Fourth Amendment, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 499, 499 (2006) (“The history of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence traces the struggle of successive courts to define 
‘reasonableness,’ and balance the competing needs of personal privacy and police 
efficiency.”).  See also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing common law principles and judicial 
deference to police officers); Part III.B (noting the gap between the Fourth Amendment’s 
reasonableness test and police officer training). 
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II of this Note discusses school violence, new and old police policies in 
response to school shootings, and the Supreme Court’s interpretation of 
excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.9  Part III analyzes three 
major problems with current attempts to remedy school violence, which 
include:  the previous approaches to remedy school violence; 
interpreting and applying the current Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness test; and the recent, unclear police policies.10  Part IV 
proposes establishing mandatory preventive measures and creating a 
bright-line rule for situations in which officers respond to a school 
shooting, thus eliminating the Fourth Amendment reasonableness test.11 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Since the Columbine High School shootings, other highly publicized 
school shootings have continued to instill fear in communities around 
America.12  In response, educators, law enforcement officials, mental 
health professionals, and parents have tried to prevent school violence.13  
Additionally, in efforts to prevent large-scale casualties, police 
departments have adopted aggressive tactics to neutralize perpetrators 
in violent school attacks.14  Despite the apparent need for responsive 
                                                 
9 See infra Part II (discussing the current status of violence in schools and previous 
legislative approaches to remedy the violence; the Court’s definition, interpretation, and 
application of excessive force under the Fourth Amendment; and the divergence from the 
old, inactive police procedures of quarantining to the new, proactive trend of eliminating 
the shooter). 
10 See infra Part III (analyzing problems with previous approaches to remedy school 
violence, problems with interpreting and applying the current reasonableness test, and 
problems with the recent, unclear police policies). 
11 See infra Part IV (proposing the creation of mandatory preventive measures and a 
bright-line rule for school shootings, which would replace the Fourth Amendment 
reasonableness test in such situations). 
12 See Maxwell, supra note 2 (“The spate of shootings has thrust school violence into a 
national spotlight not seen since the 1999 slayings at Columbine High School in Jefferson 
County, Colo.”).  Despite the fear, “school safety experts urged caution against 
overreacting to the horrific, but rare, incidents in rural schools in Colorado, Pennsylvania, 
and Wisconsin.”  Id.  See also ROBERT A. FEIN ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF 
EDUC., THREAT ASSESSMENT IN SCHOOLS:  A GUIDE TO MANAGING THREATENING SITUATIONS 
AND TO CREATING SAFE SCHOOL CLIMATES 3 (2002), http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ 
ssi_guide.pdf.  “However, highly publicized school shootings have created uncertainty 
about the safety and security of this country s [sic] schools and generated fear that an attack 
might occur in any school, in any community.”  Id. 
13 See FEIN ET AL., supra note 12, at 3.  In searching for explanations, these individuals 
have tried to answer “two central questions:  ‘Could we have known that these attacks 
were being planned?’ and, if so, ‘What could we have done to prevent these attacks from 
occurring?’”  Id. 
14 See Jerome Burdi, Fla. Police Department Training for Active Shooter in Schools:  “We 
Can’t Afford to Wait for the SWAT Team When Innocent People Can Be Dying Inside” 
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police action, police departments must ensure the perpetrator’s Fourth 
Amendment rights are protected.15  If they do not, they may be civilly 
liable for their actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.16  
Part II.A examines the prevalence of school violence in America and 
the need for additional security measures.17  Part II.B defines excessive 
force by reviewing the federal courts’ interpretation of Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.18  Part II.C discusses the recent response 
taken by law enforcement officials towards school violence.19 
                                                                                                             
(July 13, 2007), http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/1289217-Fla-police-
department-training-for-active-shooter-in-schools/ (discussing new strategies and training 
Florida police officers are required to undergo); First Shot Hits . . . Anytime! (Sept. 11, 2001) 
[hereinafter First Shot Hits], http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/44362-First-
shot-hits-Anytime/ (noting that traditional firearms training is inefficient in real-life 
scenarios, resulting in decreased accuracy of police officers and increased levels of stress); 
Maxwell, supra note 2 (“In many communities, local law-enforcement officers stepped up 
their presence near schools . . . .”); 20 Police from Four States and Volunteer Hostages 
Prepare for a Situation They Pray Won’t (July 5, 2000), http://www.policeone.com/ 
training/articles/44494-20-police-from-four-states-and-volunteer-hostages-prepare-for-a-
situation-they-pray-wont/ (discussing new strategies and training techniques police 
officers are required to follow). 
15 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
Id. 
16 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006). 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought 
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s 
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a 
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.  
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable 
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a 
statute of the District of Columbia. 
Id. 
17 See infra Part II.A (discussing the current trends in school violence and the attempts to 
remedy it). 
18 See infra Part II.B (defining excessive force and the interpretation of the Fourth 
Amendment). 
19 See infra Part II.C (discussing the traditional and contemporary police policies 
regarding active school shootings). 
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A. Violence in Schools 
School-associated violent deaths rarely occur, but when they do, 
they tend to have far-reaching effects on the surrounding communities, 
as well as throughout the entire United States.20  These events tend to be 
so rare that, on average, less than two percent of youth homicides occur 
at school.21  Statistics remained under two percent from July 1, 1992 
through June 30, 1999, indicating that there was no significant increase in 
the number of youth homicides at schools.22  Since that time, however, 
the number of school deaths have fluctuated greatly.23  A reasonable 
explanation for this fluctuation and overall decrease in violence could be 
                                                 
20 See INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND 
SAFETY:  2007 (2007), http://nces.ed.gov/programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2007/ 
ind_01.asp.  A school-associated violent death is defined as “a homicide, suicide, legal 
intervention (involving a law enforcement officer), or unintentional firearm-related death 
in which the fatal injury occurred on the campus of a functioning elementary or secondary 
school in the United States.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  The study further noted that 
“[v]iolent deaths at schools are rare but tragic events with far-reaching effects on the school 
population and surrounding community.”  Id.  Often the targets of these crimes are 
students, staff members, and others who are not students.  Id. 
21 See Maxwell, supra note 2 (noting that people should listen to officials and refrain from 
overreacting to horrific, but rare, school shootings).  “Between the 1992–93 and 2001–02 
school years, 116 were killed in 93 incidents by students in U.S. schools . . . .If you divide 
those incidents by 119,000 schools, it turns out that the average school can expect 
something like this once every 12,000 years . . . .”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  See also 
INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY:  2007, supra note 20.  “The percentage of youth 
homicides occurring at school remained at less than 2 percent of the total number of youth 
homicides over all available survey years even though the absolute number of homicides of 
school-age youth at school varied to some degree across the years.”  Id.  It was further 
noted that, “[f]rom July 1, 2005, through June 30, 2006, there were 35 school-associated 
violent deaths in elementary and secondary schools in the United States,” while the overall 
number of homicides for this age group in 2004–05 reached 1534.  Id.  Consequently, youth 
were over fifty times more likely to be murdered and over 150 times more likely to commit 
suicide off-campus, than on-campus.  Id. 
22 See INDICATORS OF SCHOOL CRIME AND SAFETY:  2007, supra note 20.  “During this 
period, between 28 and 34 homicides of school-age youth occurred at school in each school 
year.”  Id. 
23 See id.  “The number of homicides of school-age youth at school declined between the 
1998–99 and 1999–2000 school years from 33 to 13 homicides.  The number of homicides of 
school-age youth at school increased from 11 to 21 between the 2000–01 and 2004–05 school 
years, but dropped to 14 in 2005–06.”  Id.  See also INST. OF EDUC. SCIS., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., 
TABLE 1.1.  NUMBER OF SCHOOL-ASSOCIATED VIOLENT DEATHS, HOMICIDES, AND SUICIDES OF 
YOUTH AGES 5–18, BY LOCATION AND YEAR:  1992–2006 (2007), http://nces.ed.gov/ 
programs/crimeindicators/crimeindicators2007/tables/table_01_1.asp?referrer=report 
(noting that from 1992–93 there were fifty-seven deaths; 1993–94, forty-eight deaths; 1994–
95, forty-eight deaths; 1995–96, fifty-three deaths; 1996–97, forty-eight deaths; 1997–98, 
fifty-seven deaths; 1998–99, forty-seven deaths; 1999–2000, thirty-six deaths; 2000–01, thirty 
deaths, 2001–02, thirty-seven deaths; 2002–03, thirty-five deaths; 2003–04, thirty-six deaths; 
2004–05, fifty deaths; and 2005–06, thirty-five deaths). 
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attributed to the decreased presence of weapons on campus properties.24  
Despite the lower presence of weapons and violence, student absentee 
rates rose due to unsafe feelings at school or on their way to or from 
school.25  As a result, schools, police, governments, and parents have 
made efforts to prevent school violence by altering school and police 
policies.26 
Schools can be the first line of defense against violence, but it is often 
difficult to assess potential threats because characteristics and 
backgrounds of perpetrators vary.27  Recognizing this, the Federal 
                                                 
24 See NAT’L CTR. FOR CHRONIC DISEASE PREVENTION & HEALTH PROMOTION, TRENDS IN 
THE PREVALENCE OF SELECTED RISK BEHAVIORS FOR ALL STUDENTS NATIONAL YRBS:  1991–
2007 (2007), http://www.cdc.gov/HealthyYouth/yrbs/pdf/yrbs07_us_summary_trend_ 
all.pdf.  The Youth Risk Behavior Survey (YRBS) is conducted every two years, 
representative of all high school students, both in private and public schools throughout 
the United States.  Id.  The students were surveyed regarding whether they had carried a 
weapon (knife, gun, or club, etc.) to school on at least one day during the thirty days before 
the survey.  Id.  The survey reported:  in 1991, 26.1% of students had carried a weapon; 
1993, 22.1%; 1995, 20.0%; 1997, 18.3%; 1999, 17.3%; 2001, 17.4%; 2003, 17.1%; 2005, 18.5%; 
and 2007, 18.0%.  Id. 
25 See id.  Students were surveyed on whether they had missed at least one day of school 
during the thirty days before the survey because they felt unsafe at school or on their way 
to or from school.  Id.  The survey reported:  in 1993, 4.4% had not attended; 1995, 4.5%; 
1997, 4.0%; 1999, 5.2%; 2001, 6.6%, 2003, 5.4%; 2005, 6.0%; and 2007, 5.5%.  Id. 
26 See Maxwell, supra note 2.  “The three school shootings that left a principal and six 
students dead in less than a week have sparked a barrage of pledges from national and 
state political leaders to tighten campus security.”  Id. 
27 See id. 
The string of attacks—two by intruders, one by a student—began on 
Sept. 27, when a 53-year-old gunman took six female students hostage, 
sexually assaulted them, and killed one before shooting himself in a 
classroom at Platte Canyon High School in Bailey, Colo. 
Two days later, Eric Hainstock, 15, fatally shot his principal at Weston 
High School in Cazenovia, Wis., a farming community about 70 miles 
northwest of Madison. 
And on Oct. 2, a 32-year-old milk truck driver laid siege to a one-room 
Amish schoolhouse in Lancaster County, Pa., shooting and killing five 
girls, ages 7 through 13, before killing himself.  Five other girls were 
seriously wounded in the attack, and one of them, a 6-year-old, was 
reported to have been discharged from the hospital to die at home. 
Id.  See also Family of Gay Boy Says Dress Code Led to Killing, EDUC. WK., Aug. 15, 2008, 
available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/08/15/145667cgaystudentkilled 
lawsuit_ap.html (discussing that the family of the gay teenager blamed the school district 
for allowing their son to wear makeup and feminine clothing to school, which could have 
led to his death).  Not only is difficult to assess potential threats, but determining threats 
based on profiling may not be an effective deterrent.  See Melissa G. Cohen, Note & 
Comment, They Appear To Be The Same, But They Are Not The Same . . . A Student Profiling 
Technique Will Not Effectively Deter Juvenile Violence in Our Schools, 17 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. 
RTS. 299 (2000) (arguing that student profiling is not an effective deterrent to crime in 
American schools). 
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Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), Secret Service, and United States 
Department of Education (“Department of Education”) joined together 
to aid schools by developing threat assessment programs.28  Congress, 
with pressure from special interest groups, has also attempted to 
promote safe schools by passing numerous statutes and providing 
schools with additional funding to curb school violence.29 
                                                 
28 See MARY ELLEN O’TOOLE, FED. BUREAU OF INV., THE SCHOOL SHOOTER:  A THREAT 
ASSESSMENT PERSPECTIVE 7–8 (1999), http://www.fbi.gov/publications/school/school2. 
pdf (noting specific factors to be used in threat assessment such as specific, plausible 
details; emotional content of a threat; and any precipitating stressors). 
 Specific, plausible details are a critical factor in evaluating a 
threat.  Details can include the identity of the victim or victims; the 
reason for making the threat; the means, weapon, and method by 
which it is to be carried out; the date, time, and place where the 
threatened act will occur; and concrete information about plans or 
preparations that have already been made. 
Id. at 7 (emphasis removed).  Additionally, the amount of detail can be a factor because 
substantial planning and greater detail shows more preparation and therefore should be 
considered high risk, whereas less detailed threats should be considered low risk.  Id. at 7–
8.  The next factor is the emotional content of a threat which can produce clues regarding 
the threat maker’s mental state.  Id. at 8.  Although these threats may give clues to the 
mental state, they are not helpful for measuring danger; therefore, it is difficult to 
determine the amount of risk that should be assigned to them.  Id.  The last factor is 
precipitating stressors.  Id.  These are “incidents, circumstances, reactions, or situations that 
can trigger a threat.  The precipitating event may seem insignificant and have no direct 
relevance to the threat, but nonetheless becomes a catalyst.”  Id.  See also FEIN ET AL., supra 
note 12, at iii (“Since June 1999, the U.S. Department of Education and the U.S. Secret 
Service have been working as a team to try to better understand and ultimately help 
prevent school shootings in America.”); WILLIAM S. POLLACK ET AL., U.S. SECRET SERV. & 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF POTENTIAL SCHOOL-BASED VIOLENCE:  
INFORMATION STUDENTS LEARN MAY PREVENT A TARGETED ATTACK (2008), 
http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/bystander_study.pdf; BRYAN VOSSEKUIL ET AL., U.S. 
SECRET SERV. & U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., THE FINAL REPORT AND FINDINGS OF THE SAFE SCHOOL 
INITIATIVE:  IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PREVENTION OF SCHOOL ATTACKS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(2002), http://www.secretservice.gov/ntac/ssi_final_report.pdf. 
29 See MEMBERS OF THE NAT’L SAFE SCHS. P’SHIP, BRIDGING THE GAP IN FEDERAL LAW:  
PROMOTING SAFE SCHOOL AND IMPROVED STUDENT ACHIEVEMENT BY PREVENTING BULLYING 
AND HARASSMENT IN OUR SCHOOLS 2 (2007), http://www.glsen.org/binary-
data/GLSEN_ATTACHMENTS/file/000/000/912-1.pdf  (recommending Congress amend 
federal law to ensure that schools and districts have comprehensive and effective student 
conduct policies, schools and districts focus on prevention strategies and professional 
development to address bullying and harassment, and states and districts maintain 
bullying and harassment data); National Education Association, Partnership Calls on 
Congress to Help Prevent Bullying (July 2007), http://www.nea.org/tools/30446.htm 
(noting that over thirty leading groups have called on Congress to take action to prevent 
bullying and harassment in schools).  See also infra notes 30–35 and accompanying text 
(discussing the numerous acts Congress passed in attempts to curb school violence). 
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Congress’s first effort was the Gun-Free School Zones Act passed in 
1990, but was later found unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.30  In 
response, Congress created the Gun-Free Schools Act in 1994, noting that 
the presence of guns near schools affected interstate commerce.31  This 
Act required state schools receiving federal funds to suspend individuals 
violating the law.32  The Act also it mandated that possessing a firearm 
on school grounds was a felony offense and subjected violators to 
criminal prosecution.33 
Since the Gun-Free School Act, senators have proposed additional 
legislation to deter school violence and upgrade school safety 
programs.34  Specifically, these bills increased spending by providing 
                                                 
30 See James C. Hanks, Weapons in Schools, in SCHOOL VIOLENCE:  FROM DISCIPLINE TO 
DUE PROCESS 15 (James C. Hanks ed., 2004) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000)). 
In 1995, the Supreme Court held the Gun-Free School Zones Act 
unconstitutional, as exceeding Congress’s power under the Commerce 
Clause.  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).  As it read at the 
time, the statute “made it a federal offense ‘for any individual 
knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or 
has reasonable cause to believe, is a school zone.’” 
Id. at 15 n.1 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995) (quoting 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(q)(1)(A) (1988 ed., Supp. V))). 
31 See Hanks, supra note 30, at 15 n.1 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1) (2000)). 
In addition, the statute now contains a jurisdictional requirement, 
which prohibits only knowing possession of “a firearm that has moved 
in . . . interstate or foreign commerce” in a school zone.  Id. § 922(q)(2)(A) 
(emphasis added).  The Amended Gun-Free Schools Act has been 
upheld as a constitutional exercise of Congress’s commerce power.  
See, e.g., United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037, 1039 (8th Cir. 1999). 
Id.  Consequently, “[t]he Gun-Free Schools Act, as Spending Clause legislation, is not 
subject to the same constitutional vulnerability as the pre-Lopez Gun-Free School Zones 
Act.”  Id. at 15 n.2 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (Supp. 2003)). 
32 See id. at 16 (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 7151 (b)(1)). 
The Gun-Free Schools Act requires states receiving federal funds for 
education to enact state laws that require “local educational agencies to 
expel from school for a period of not less than 1 year a student who is 
determined to have brought a firearm to school, or to have possessed a 
firearm at school.” 
Id.  See also Ann Majestic, Carolyn Waller & Julie Devine, Disciplining the Violent Student 
with Disabilities, in SCHOOL VIOLENCE:  FROM DISCIPLINE TO DUE PROCESS 155 (James C. 
Hanks ed., 2004) (citing 20 U.S.C. § 8921 (1994)) (“At the federal level, Congress has passed 
legislation requiring schools that receive federal funds to institute a mandatory 365-day 
suspension for any student who brings a gun to school.”). 
33 See Hanks, supra note 30, at 16–17 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(4)) (“A violation is 
punishable by a fine and up to five years’ imprisonment.”). 
34 See School Safety and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 2007, S. 2084, 110th 
Cong. 1 (2007) (noting its purpose was “[t]o promote school safety, improved law 
enforcement, and for other purposes.”); School Safety Enhancements Act of 2007, S. 1217, 
110th Cong. 1 (2007) (stating its purpose was “[t]o enhance the safety of elementary 
schools, secondary schools, and institutions of higher education.”); School Safety 
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additional funds to schools that complied with various safety 
requirements.35  As a result of these financial benefits, states and schools 
have implemented additional safety standards and programs.36 
In many states, possessing a firearm on school grounds is illegal.37  
Despite general similarities regarding gun possession, punishments for 
                                                                                                             
Enhancements Act of 2007, S. 677, 110th Cong. 1 (2007) (indicating its purpose was “[t]o 
improve the grant program for secure schools under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968.”).  See also School Safety and Law Enforcement Improvement Act of 
2007, S. REP. NO. 110-183 (2007) (report to S. 2084, explaining information regarding the 
proposed bill). 
 The bill provides a responsible and effective congressional 
response to school incidents that have occurred in the recent past and, 
in particular, to the tragedy that took place on April 16, 2007 on the 
campus of Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia 
Tech) in Blacksburg, Virginia.  The bill is intended in part to address 
the recurring problem of violence in our schools through additional 
support to law enforcement in both public and private educational 
settings, and to make needed improvements to the National Instant 
Criminal Background Check System. 
Id. at 2. 
35 See S. 2084, at 3–5, 12 (proposed “striking $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2001 
through 2009 and inserting $50,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2008 and 2009” for those 
schools that use surveillance equipment, locks, lighting, metal detectors, other measures, 
establish hotlines or tiplines, use capital improvements to make schools more secure, 
conduct safety assessments, conduct security training, coordinate with federal, state, and 
local law enforcement, test emergency response, and develop and implement a campus 
emergency response plan) (internal quotations omitted); S. 1217, at 2, 4–5 (proposing 
“striking $30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2001 through 2009 and inserting $50,000,000 for 
each of the fiscal years 2008 and 2009” for those schools that use surveillance equipment, 
establish hotlines or tiplines, use capital improvements to make schools more secure, 
conduct annual campus safety assessments, and develop and implement a campus 
emergency response plan) (internal quotations omitted); S. 677, at 2–4 (proposing “striking 
$30,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2001 through 2009 and inserting $50,000,000 for each of 
the fiscal years 2008 and 2009” for those schools that use surveillance equipment, establish 
hotlines or tiplines, and use capital improvements to make schools more secure) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
36 See infra notes 37–52 and accompanying text (discussing state and school programs 
implemented). 
37 See Hanks, supra note 30, at 16 & n.5.  Sample statutes include: 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(b) (West 2003) (prohibiting the possession of 
a firearm in a school zone); FLA. STAT. ch. 790.115 (2002) (prohibiting 
the possession of any weapon “at a school-sponsored event or on the 
property of any school, school bus, or school bus stop,” and 
prohibiting the exhibition of any weapon within 1,000 feet of a school 
during school hours or activities); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (2002) 
(prohibiting the possession of specified weapons in “school safety 
zones”); IOWA CODE § 724.4B(1) (2003) (prohibiting the possession of a 
firearm on the grounds of a school); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:95.2 
(West 2003) (prohibiting the possession of firearms and “dangerous 
weapons” on “a school campus, on school transportation, or at any 
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violating the state statutes vary greatly.38  For example, in Iowa, the fine 
imposed for carrying a gun inside a school zone is double the fine 
imposed for carrying a gun outside a school zone.39  California’s statute 
is similar, but the punishment “ranges from a three-month sentence in 
county jail to a five year sentence in state prison” and applies to offenses 
that occur in institutions of higher learning.40  Georgia’s statute, 
however, is stricter than both of these because it applies to elementary or 
secondary schools, technical schools, vocational schools, colleges, 
universities, and other institutes of post-secondary education.41  Under 
the Georgia statute, possessing a weapon is also a felony punishable “by 
a fine of not more than $10,000, by imprisonment for not less than two 
nor more than ten years, or both.”42  While states implemented different 
criminal sanctions, school policies focused primarily on prevention.43 
For schools, zero-tolerance policies are the most common method of 
prevention.44  Although these policies are credited with reducing school 
                                                                                                             
school sponsored function . . . , or within one thousand feet of any 
school campus”); WIS. STAT. § 948.605(2) (2003) (making it a felony to 
possess a firearm in a school zone). 
Id. 
38 See id. at 17 (noting that the laws impacting weapons possession vary in terms of 
scope and punishments). 
39 See id. (citing IOWA CODE § 724.4A(2) (2003)).  The Iowa Code on Weapons Free Zones 
provides: 
1. As used in this section, “weapons free zone” means the area in or on, 
or within one thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public 
or private elementary or secondary school, or in or on the real property 
comprising a public park. . . . 
2. Notwithstanding sections 902.9 and 903.1, a person who commits a 
public offense involving a firearm or offensive weapon, within a 
weapons free zone, in violation of this or any other chapter shall be 
subject to a fine of twice the maximum amount which may otherwise 
be imposed for the public offense. 
IOWA CODE § 724.4A (2008).  It further provides: 
1. A person who goes armed with, carries, or transports a firearm of 
any kind, whether concealed or not, on the grounds of a school 
commits a class “D” felony. For the purposes of this section, “school” 
means a public or nonpublic school as defined in section 280.2. 
Id. § 724.4B(1). 
40 Hanks, supra note 30, at 17 & nn.15–16 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 626.9(f) (West 2003)). 
41 See id. at 17–18 & n.18 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1 (2002)). 
42 GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(b). 
43 See infra notes 45–52 and accompanying text (discussing school’s prevention policies). 
44 A zero-tolerance policy “provides predetermined consequences for specific offenses.”  
David M. Pedersen, Zero-Tolerance Policies, in SCHOOL VIOLENCE:  FROM DISCIPLINE TO DUE 
PROCESS 47, 48 (James C. Hanks ed., 2004) (citing Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and 
Expelling Children From Educational Opportunity:  Time to Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 
AM. U. L. REV. 1039, 1043 (2001)) (noting that in 1998, nine out of ten public schools had 
employed zero-tolerance policies for firearms and weapons).  “A zero-tolerance program’s 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/5
2010] Shortcomings in School Shootings 1105 
violence, they are criticized for inflexibility and over-inclusiveness.45  
They are also detrimental to learning environments because school 
administrators are not afforded discretion; rather, students are 
automatically punished even for unintentional policy violations, which 
can hinder student development.46  As a result, experts advocating for 
additional safety plans in schools have warned against losing 
perspective and fortressing schools; however, many schools continue to 
use these policies and sometimes extend the policies to apply to other 
                                                                                                             
goal is to act as a deterrent and provide swift intervention for misconduct, sending a 
strong, ‘one strike and you’re out’ message to students.”  Rhonda B. Armistead, Zero 
Tolerance:  The School Woodshed, EDUC. WK., June 11, 2008, at 24, available at 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/06/11/41armistead_ep.h27.html.  For a 
continued and detailed discussion of zero-tolerance policies, see Nora M. Findlay, Should 
There Be Zero Tolerance For Zero Tolerance School Discipline Policies?, 18 EDUC. & L.J. 103 
(2008); Paul M. Bogos, Note, “Expelled.  No Excuses.  No Exceptions.”—Michigan’s Zero-
Tolerance Policy In Response To School Violence:  M.C.L.A. Section 380.1311, 74 U. DET. MERCY 
L. REV. 357 (1997); Alicia C. Insley, Comment, Suspending and Expelling Children From 
Educational Opportunity:  Time To Reevaluate Zero Tolerance Policies, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 1039 
(2001); Sheena Molsbee, Comment, Zeroing Out Zero Tolerance:  Eliminating Zero Tolerance 
Policies In Texas Schools, 40 TEX. TECH L. REV.  325 (2008). 
45 See Pedersen, supra note 44, at 47 (“The decrease in violent crime may be attributed to 
the increasing application of ‘Zero-Tolerance Policies’ to serious student offenses.”).  
However: 
Overtones of absolutism and inflexibility accompany zero-tolerance 
policies, leading education and legal scholars to sharply criticize such 
policies.  Under zero-tolerance policies, educators are often unable to 
distinguish between threats to school safety and innocent mistakes by 
students.  The following is an example of a rigid application of zero-
tolerance policies to seemingly innocuous behavior: 
 A student at Blue Ridge Middle School in Loudon County, 
Virginia, was suspended for 16 weeks after he convinced a 
suicidal friend to give him the knife she intended to use to kill 
herself.  The student put the knife in his locker and reported the 
incident to the principal.  While the school praised the student for 
helping his friend, the school board determined that the student’s 
actions violated the school’s zero-tolerance policy with respect to 
possession of weapons and suspended the student. 
Id. at 49.  See also Armistead, supra note 44 (“Few policies in education have proven to be as 
universally ineffective—even counterproductive—as ‘zero-tolerance.’”). 
46 See Armistead, supra note 44 (discussing how zero-tolerance policies are solely 
punitive and are counterproductive to the school’s primary goals of learning and 
development). 
Such a one-size-fits-all framework seriously limits administrators’ use 
of their professional judgment in a given situation, and often forces 
them to impose punishments they otherwise feel are inappropriate to 
the facts.  It also fails to take into account the intricacies of child 
development, individual characteristics, risk factors, and underlying 
causes, all of which shape behavior. 
Id. 
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immature and illegal behaviors.47  Despite the prevalence of zero-
tolerance policies, schools have also used other alternative methods to 
ensure safety.48 
The most radical alternative can be found in Texas, where one school 
district recently allowed teachers to carry concealed weapons.49  This is 
                                                 
47 See Maxwell, supra note 2. 
But aside from carrying out existing safety plans, experts urged a 
measured response to the shootings.  Any new safety policies and 
increased security measures should be done in a thoughtful way, 
without turning schools into fortresses, they said.  “Understandably, 
there is a rush in these situations to do something and that gives the 
illusion that things will be safer,” said Dewey G. Cornell, an education 
professor and the director of the Virginia Youth Violence Project at the 
University of Virginia in Charlottesville.  “But the tragedy and distress 
of these events in our schools can make us lose perspective.” 
Id.  “Despite the zero-tolerance concept’s shortcomings, however, states and school districts 
have extended its reach beyond weapons and drugs, to include an array of behaviors, such 
as sexual harassment, bullying, and dress-code violations.”  Armistead, supra note 44. 
48 See Maxwell, supra note 2 (noting that some educators have enforced precautions by 
locking doors and forcing visitors to check in before being allowed to walk school 
hallways); Texas Students Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, EDUC. WK., Aug. 25, 2008, 
available at http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/08/25/150810guntotingteachers_ 
ap.html (noting that a high school in Texas locked doors and had security cameras).  A 
better policy is to have “an awareness of your school environment.”  Maxwell, supra note 2.  
Other methods have created real and imagined barriers such as signs warning against 
guns, drugs, and trespassing, or the presence of more adults.  Id.  However, it has also been 
warned that “[t]hose features tend to become more a pacifier than a panacea . . . .”  Id. 
Meanwhile, some students are being instructed to fight back using whatever is 
available.  See Alan Scher Zagier, Colleges Confront Shootings with Survival Training 
(Aug. 27, 2008), http://www.policeone.com/school-violence/articles/1729501-Colleges-
confront-shootings-with-survival-training/.  “The training discourages cowering in a 
corner or huddling together in fear . . . .  Instead, Metropolitan Community College faculty 
members were taught to be aware of their surroundings and to think of common classroom 
objects—such as laptops and backpacks—as ‘improvised weapons.’”  Id. 
49 See Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, EDUC. WK., Aug. 15, 2008, available at 
http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2008/08/15/145829bctxguntotingteachers_ap.html 
(discussing a Texas school district’s decision to allow teachers to carry pistols); Texas 
Students Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48 (discussing reactions to a Texas 
school district’s decision to allow teachers to carry pistols).  Before being permitted to carry 
a firearm. a teacher:  must possess “a Texas license to carry a concealed handgun; must be 
authorized to carry by the district; must receive training in crisis management and hostile 
situations and have to use ammunition that is designed to minimize the risk of ricochet in 
school halls.”  Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, supra.  The superintendent justified 
the decision because it is a small community which is thirty minutes from the sheriff’s 
office and “‘[w]hen you outlaw guns in a certain area, the only people who follow that are 
law-abiding citizens, and everybody else ignores it.’”  Id.  However, both students and 
parents have had mixed reactions to the new policy.  Id.  See also Jennifer Frederick, Do As I 
Say, Not As I Do:  Why Teachers Should Not Be Allowed To Carry Guns On School Property, 28 
J.L. & EDUC. 139 (1999) (arguing that teachers are role models for children so if we do not 
want children to bring guns to school, then teachers should not either); David B. Kopel, 
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the only school district in the country allowing such a policy.50  More 
traditional alternatives, such as anti-violence programs or requiring 
police presence on school premises, are popular among high schools.51  
Despite pressures to change, some districts have not altered their 
methods of addressing violence, but instead have enhanced expulsion 
policies and threatened students with greater punishments.52  Even with 
the apparent improvements and attempts to remedy school violence, 
surveys show that schools are still vulnerable to attack.53 
Beginning in 2001, the National School Safety and Security Services 
conducted a survey for the National Association of School Resource 
Officers (“NASRO”).54  School Resource Officers (“SROs”) reported that 
                                                                                                             
Pretend “Gun-Free” School Zones:  A Deadly Legal Fiction, 42 CONN. L. REV. 515, 515 (2009) 
(analyzing the empirical evidence and policy arguments regarding licensed campus carry 
policies and advocating that “complete prohibition of armed defense on school campuses 
by all faculty and by all adult students is irrational and deadly”); Brian J. Siebel, The Case 
Against Guns On Campus, 18 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 319 (2008) (advocating that guns 
should not be allowed on college campuses). 
50 See Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, supra note 49; Texas Students Pack Bookbags; 
Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48. 
51 See Leah M. Christensen, Sticks, Stones, and Schoolyard Bullies:  Restorative Justice, 
Mediation and a New Approach to Conflict Resolution in Our Schools, 9 NEV. L.J. 545, 546 (2009) 
(discussing the effects of bullying, mediation, and other conflict resolution programs, and 
“consider[ing] the Social Inclusion Approach, a program based upon the work of Kim John 
Payne, M.Ed., an international educator and counselor who developed a restorative justice 
approach to deal with conflict in schools, as a mechanism to effectively prevent and handle 
bullying in schools.”); Kathleen M. Cerrone, Comment, The Gun-Free Schools Act of 1994:  
Zero Tolerance Takes Aim at Procedural Due Process, 20 PACE L. REV. 131, 155 (1999) (citing 
Jean Rimbach & John Mooney, Whitman Unveils Plan to Cut School Violence, THE RECORD 
(N.J.), Sept. 4, 1998, at A3) (noting that the “district has instituted peer-mediation and 
leadership programs and it plans to create a new group to present anti-violence assemblies 
and that officials have seen beneficial effects from police presence by providing “training in 
school violence prevention, conflict mediation, counseling, sexual harassment, and how to 
handle secret tips from students.”).  But see Scott Buhrmaster, Should Campus Cops Carry 
Guns?  One College President Says No (Nov. 19, 2003), http://www.policeone.com/ 
writers/columnists/Scott-Buhrmaster/articles/72520-Should-campus-cops-carry-guns-
One-college-president-says-no/ (discussing a president’s opposition to armed officers on a 
community college’s campus).  “When asked to explain her anti-armed officer position she 
replied, ‘Much of the research shows that having armed public safety officers on campus 
increases the chances for more violence.’”  Id. 
52 See Cerrone, Comment, supra note 51, at 154 (citing Kathleen Parrish & Christian D. 
Berg, Pennsylvania Bill Seeks Millions to Fight School Violence:  State Representative Julie Harhart 
will Introduce the Law With Attorney General's Backing, ALLENTOWN MORNING CALL, Sept. 15, 
1998, at A1). 
53 See infra notes 54–63 and accompanying text (discussing annual surveys revealing 
security problems at schools). 
54 See generally KENNETH S. TRUMP, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, 2001 NASRO 
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER SURVEY 1 (2001), http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/ 
2001NASROsurvey%20NSSSS.pdf [hereinafter 2001 NASRO SURVEY] (“[T]his survey 
information is drawn from the largest sampled population of SROs from the front-lines of 
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their programs improved school safety, prevented crime and violence, 
and fostered positive relationships between students and faculty.55  
Many SROs also reported preventing assaults against faculty and staff.56  
A majority of SROs reported that they believed an armed SRO did not 
put students at a greater risk of harm, but that an unarmed SRO did 
increase the risk of harm.57  Overall, the 2001 SRO survey illustrated 
school safety improvements, but similar surveys conducted from 2002–
2004 revealed a different trend.58 
                                                                                                             
school safety.”).  A sixty-one question survey was developed and distributed at a school-
based police officer conference.  Id.  A total of 1000 surveys were distributed and 717 of 
them were returned, twenty-eight of which were completed by school administrators.  Id.  
These twenty-eight surveys were voided and the findings were based upon the results of 
the other 689 surveys.  Id. 
55 Id. at 2 (finding that 99% (683) respondents believed their SRO programs were 
successful).  Furthermore, rating relationships on a scale of one to five (one being poor and 
five being excellent), respondents reported having an average relationship rate of 4.40 with 
school administrators, 4.39 with students, 4.36 with school support staff, and 4.27 with 
teachers.  Id. 
56 See id. at 5 (finding that 67% (460) of respondents had prevented an assault by a 
student or other individual for an approximate total of 3200 cases in their combined 
careers, thus averaging seven per officer).  Furthermore: 
A total of 92% of the respondents reported preventing from 1 to 25 
violent acts in an average school year.  57% (394) of School Resource 
Officers report preventing 11 or more acts of violence in an average 
school year, with 28% (190) of them reporting that they prevent more 
than 25 violent acts in an average year.  An additional 35% (240) of 
respondents report preventing between 1 and 10 violent acts in an 
average year.  Only 2% report that they have not prevented a violent 
incident in an average school year. 
Id.  SROs have also reported that: 
approximately 24% (165) of the respondents have taken a loaded 
firearm from a student or other individual on campus . . . .Of the 24% 
officers who have taken a loaded firearm, an approximate total of 344 
incidents have occurred during their SRO careers for an average of 
over 2 times per officer. 
Id. at 6. 
57 Id. at 3 (finding that 98% (673) of respondents did not believe armed SROs put 
students in harm, and 91% (625) of respondents believed that unarmed SROs put students 
in harm). 
58 See KENNETH S. TRUMP, NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, SCHOOL SAFETY LEFT 
BEHIND?  SCHOOL SAFETY THREATS GROW AS PREPAREDNESS STALLS & FUNDING DECREASES 
4–6 (2004), http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/2004%20NASRO%20Survey%20 
Final%20Report%20NSSSS.pdf [hereinafter 2004 NASRO SURVEY] (noting that threats 
continued to persist, school plans remained inadequate, and funding decreased); KENNETH 
S. TRUMP,  NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, SCHOOL SAFETY THREATS PERSIST, FUNDING 
DECREASING:  NASRO 2003 NATIONAL SCHOOL-BASED LAW ENFORCEMENT SURVEY 6 (2003), 
http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/2003NASROSurvey%20NSSSS.pdf [hereinafter 
2003 NASRO SURVEY] (asserting that threats and problems continued to persist due in part 
to lack of funding); KENNETH S. TRUMP,  NAT’L ASS’N OF SCH. RES. OFFICERS, 2002 NASRO 
SCHOOL RESOURCE OFFICER SURVEY 4 (2002), http://www.schoolsecurity.org/resources/ 
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The most significant findings of the 2002 survey revealed major 
security issues, such as terrorism, threat response, and SRO training.59  In 
                                                                                                             
2002NASROSurvey%20NSSSS.pdf [hereinafter 2002 NASRO SURVEY] (stating schools were 
highly vulnerable to attack and would not be able to respond adequately); 2001 NASRO 
SURVEY, supra note 54, at 14 (noting in its conclusion that from the SROs perspective, the 
programs were successful in improving school safety, but further noting that the safety 
threats continue to remain clear and real, and officers need to be effectively trained and 
equipped). 
59 See 2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 4 (contending that 95% of SROs reported 
their schools were vulnerable to terrorist attacks, 79% reported their districts could not 
adequately respond to an attack, a majority reported their school crisis plans were 
inadequate and untested, and finally, that SROs reported having limited training and 
minimal support from outside agencies, which was attributable to a lack of funding).  
Regarding the easy ability to access schools, “96% of SROs described gaining access to 
outside school grounds during school hours as very easy (74%) or somewhat easy (22%).  
83% of school officers described gaining access to inside of their school as very easy (37%) 
or somewhat easy (46%).”  Id. at 7.  In finding that most safety plans were inadequate due 
to insufficient implementation, review, and revision, the 2002 survey found: 
• 39% of the officers reported that a formal security assessment by a 
qualified professional has not been conducted of their school in the 
past five years. 
• 71% of the respondents were involved in developing and/or revising 
their school crisis plans, yet 55% felt that the plans for their schools are 
not adequate. 
• 52% of the SROs reported that the crisis plans for their school have 
never been tested and exercised, and in those schools where plans 
have been tested, the amount and/or type of testing has not been 
adequate, according to 62% of the respondents. 
• 74% of school officers responded that their schools do not educate 
parents and communicate effectively with parents on school safety, 
security, and crisis planning issues. 
Id.  In finding that several federal school safety initiatives and/or federal agencies were not 
helpful, the 2002 survey reported: 
• While 36% of the respondents found reports by the U.S. Secret Service 
on assessing and managing school violence threats helpful, nearly half 
of the officers had never heard of the reports and 15% reported that the 
reports did not provide any new information. 
• 72% of the officers surveyed said that the FBI was not helpful to them 
in their day-to-day work as a school-based officer. 
• Only 25% of the SROs reported that the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Safe and Drug Free Schools Program provided funding to 
directly support their work.  35% reported receiving no funding and 
40% were uncertain as to whether the program provided any direct 
support. 
• Only 28% of the SROs reported that the U.S. Department of 
Education’s Safe and Drug Free Schools Program provided resource 
materials that have been helpful to them in their day-to-day work as 
school-based officers.  39% reported receiving no materials and 33% 
were uncertain as to whether the program provided any resource 
materials.  
Id. at 9. 
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addition, the survey found that a large majority of SROs carried firearms 
believing it was beneficial to the safety of the school and students.60  The 
survey also reported that over a quarter of SROs had confiscated a 
firearm, while nearly three times as many had confiscated knives.61  
Consequently, the 2002 survey illustrated major vulnerabilities in the 
nation’s schools, many of which were repeated in the 2003 and 2004 
surveys.62  As a result, police officers are being charged with the 
                                                 
60 See id. at 10 (noting that 95% carried firearms and 99% did not believe armed SROs put 
students at additional risks of harm, while 90% believed not carrying a firearm did put 
students at additional risks of harm). 
61 See 2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 10 (noting that twenty-nine percent of SROs 
confiscated a loaded firearm, while eighty-eight percent of SROs had confiscated a knife 
from a student). 
62 See 2003 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 4 (noting that many threats continue to be 
made against U.S. schools); 2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 12 (reporting that the 
majority of school officers indicated significant gaps in school plans and policies). 
The 2003 survey revealed that school safety threats persisted, large gaps continued to 
exist in threat response programs, and low funding caused greater inadequacies.  See 2003 
NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 4–5.  The survey found: 
Over 70% of the officers reported that aggressive behaviors in 
elementary school children has increased in their districts in the past 
five years. . . . Over 55% of the respondents said that their school crisis 
plans are not adequate. . . . Over 41% of school-based police officers 
report that funding for school safety in their schools is decreasing.  
Over 85% of the survey respondents believe that the U.S. Department 
of Education’s 2004 proposed budget cut of 35% ($50 million) for state 
funding of the Safe and Drug Free Schools program will contribute to 
schools being less safe. 
Id.  As a result, the survey concluded that school violence and underpreparedness 
continued to persist, due in part to the lack of funding available to schools.  Id. at 6 
(revealing that the majority of SROs indicated that their crisis programs are inadequate, the 
preparedness of schools had not improved, and the funding is inadequate to support safe 
school environments). 
 Similarly, the 2004 survey exposed similar trends.  See 2004 NASRO SURVEY, supra 
note 58, at 4–6 (substantiating claims that crime and violence continue to threaten U.S. 
schools, schools remain vulnerable to attack, gaps in policies remain prevalent, and 
funding either remained the same or decreased).  The key findings of the 2004 survey 
revealed that violence and safety offenses continued to threaten schools, SROs believed 
that gaps continued to remain in school crisis policies, and funding continued to either 
remain the same or decline.  See id. at 4 (noting that 78% of SROs had reported confiscating 
a weapon from a student in the past year, 51% of SROs said crisis plans were inadequate, 
43% of SROs indicated that school officials do not formally meet with other emergency 
responders, more than 55% of SROs said that school faculty do not receive ongoing training 
for emergency situations, and over 70% of SROs reported that school safety funding either 
decreased or remained the same).  Consequently, the 2004 NASRO survey found little to no 
positive change in school safety, thus evidencing that attempts to remedy school violence 
by Congress, states, and schools have had little effect and that school violence will remain 
as a prevalent concern amongst officials at all levels, students, and their families.  See id. at 
7 (“It would be expected that three years after 9/11 and five years after Columbine High 
School attack, the preparedness level of schools should have improved.”).  See also 
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responsibility of responding quickly to school violence in order to disable 
perpetrators, while at the same time remaining mindful of the 
perpetrator’s constitutional rights by refraining from excessive force.63 
B. Excessive Force Defined 
“In accomplishing police objectives, officers are given great power 
and authority.”64  Police officers’ ability to use force is the greatest 
display of authority to which they are entitled; however, the type and 
degree of force must be proportional to the threat in order to accomplish 
the officer’s objective.65  Before discussing the current trends in the law, 
one must understand why and how those principles were established.66  
Part II.B.1 focuses on the history of the use of force, beginning with 
ancient history and the common law principles of excessive force.67  Part 
II.B.2 then discusses the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to 
excessive force claims, focusing only on the second prong of the 
reasonableness test.68  Finally, Part II.B.3 reveals the inconsistency among 
the federal circuits in analyzing excessive force claims.69 
                                                                                                             
O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 33 (discussing the continuing concern of families, despite the 
overall decline of violence in schools). 
 Overall, the level of violence in American schools is falling, not 
rising.  But the shock and fear generated by the recent succession of 
school shootings and other violent acts in schools—and by violence in 
society at large—have led to intense public concern about the danger 
of school violence. 
Id. 
63 See infra Part II.B (defining excessive force and the Supreme Court’s interpretation).  
See also UREY W. PATRICK & JOHN C. HALL, IN DEFENSE OF SELF AND OTHERS . . . ISSUES, 
FACTS & FALLACIES—THE REALITIES OF LAW ENFORCEMENT’S USE OF DEADLY FORCE 11–12 
(2005) (noting the three amendments within the Constitution that protect against force, 
mainly the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, but further noting that the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments fall outside the parameters of deadly force). 
64 BRIAN A. KINNAIRD, USE OF FORCE:  EXPERT GUIDANCE FOR DECISIVE FORCE RESPONSE 1 
(2003). 
65 See id.  “The use of force is the most significant display of authority and control that all 
law enforcement officers possess.  The type and amount of force that can be used, however, 
depends on exercising sound judgment and competence in accordance with legal 
guidelines and department policy.”  Id. 
66 See id. (discussing the history of the use of force); PATRICK, supra note 63, at 3 
(discussing the common law background of the use of force). 
67 See infra Part II.B.1 (tracing the background of the use of force and its development 
through the common law). 
68 See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing the current status of excessive force and the Court’s 
interpretation). 
69 See infra Part II.B.3 (examining the lower federal courts’ application of the 
reasonableness test). 
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1. Historical Background and the Use of Force During the Common 
Law Era 
It is undisputed that throughout history the use of force and 
punishment has taken various forms.70  For example, during the biblical 
period (3000 B.C.–A.D. 500), stoning was considered to be an appropriate 
punishment and could be imposed by the public.71  Then, during the 
Medieval Era (A.D. 500–1000), victims chose the appropriate punishment 
to be imposed upon the perpetrators.72  This approach continued until 
the state took sole responsibility and control over formalized 
punishments and the use of force.73  This new formalized period, known 
as the common law era, spanned from the mid-1600s to the early 1900s.74 
Under the common law, police officers were given great deference 
and were authorized to use deadly force in many different situations.75  
This lasted for most of America’s history because the Bill of Rights 
restrained only the powers of the Federal Government.76  After the 
Fourteenth Amendment was passed and incorporated, however, states 
                                                 
70 KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at 1 (explaining the various ages throughout history and 
using a few illustrations). 
71 See id. (noting that prior to formal written codes of law and morality, the public was 
responsible for determining appropriate punishments). 
72 See id. (suggesting that “these were practiced as ‘non-legal’ initiatives long before the 
legal use of force was ever developed”). 
73 See id. at 1–2 (asserting that from the Middle Ages to the late 1600s, procedures were 
developed to create less erratic punishments against offenders and that “the state governed 
the imposition of the use of force in an attempt to prevent individuals from using it in ways 
that violated others’ natural rights”). 
74 See id. at 2 (noting that from 1650–1830 policing and punishment remained public and 
corporal, but with Sir Robert Peel’s uniformed patrol divisions and investigative units, the 
early police forces were created).  Despite this early formation, it was not until the late 
1800s that most of the cities in the United States had established police forces with formal 
operations.  Id. 
75 See PATRICK, supra note 63, at 4 (discussing common law principles and noting the 
great deference given to officers); Forrest Plesko, Comment, (Im)balance and 
(Un)reasonableness:  High-Speed Police Pursuits, The Fourth Amendment, and Scott v. Harris, 85 
DENV. U. L. REV. 463, 463 (2007) (citing Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985)) 
(suggesting that a police officer could shoot a fleeing suspect).  With respect to the 
authority of police officers to use deadly force, the 18th century English jurist William 
Blackstone explained that such authority would exist in the following circumstances: 
“[1] Where an officer in the execution of his office . . . kills a person that 
assaults or resists him. 
[2] If an officer . . . attempts to take a man charged with felony, and is resisted; 
and in the endeavor to take him, kills him. 
[3] In all these cases, there must be an apparent necessity . . . otherwise, 
without such absolute necessity, it is not justifiable.” 
PATRICK, supra note 63, at 4 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *179–80, *203–
04). 
76 See PATRICK, supra note 63, at 4. 
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had to abide by the Bill of Rights and could not deprive citizens of their 
Fourth Amendment rights.77 
2. The Fourth Amendment and the Supreme Court’s Interpretation 
Under the Fourth Amendment, individuals have the right to be 
secure against unreasonable searches and seizures.78  A seizure “occurs 
only when government actors have, ‘by means of physical force or show 
of authority, . . . in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen.’”79  
Proving only that a seizure occurred is not enough to violate the Fourth 
Amendment; the seizure must also be unreasonable.80  Thus, the basic 
                                                 
77 See IAONNIS G. DIMITRAKOPOULOS, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND LIBERTIES UNDER THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION:  THE CASE LAW OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 365 & n.1 (2007) (citing 
Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769, 772 (2001); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30–34 (1963); 
Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949)); 
PATRICK, supra note 63, at 4.  However, even after incorporation, courts used the 
substantive due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to evaluate excessive force 
claims.  See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (holding that pumping a suspect’s 
stomach to obtain evidence and ensure a conviction ‘shocked the conscious’ and offended 
the Due Process Clause); Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1031 (2d Cir. 1973).  Under 
substantive due process, Judge Friendly set forth four factors to determine the liability.  
Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033.  They are as follows:  the need for the application of force, the 
relationship between the need and the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury 
inflicted, and whether force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore 
discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm.  Id.  This 
test, however, was short-lived because approximately ten years later, the Supreme Court 
determined that the reasonableness test under the Fourth Amendment provided the proper 
analysis for alleged unconstitutional seizures.  United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 702 
(1983). 
78 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
79 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 
n.16 (1968).  See California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 627–28 (1991) (citing United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980)); Brower, 489 U.S. at 596–97 (noting that a seizure 
could only occur if it was intentional; desired termination or incidental termination was not 
enough).  Furthermore, “[a]n arrest requires either physical force . . . or, where that is 
absent, submission to the assertion of authority.”  Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626. 
80 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–96 (discussing seizure and reasonableness); Brower, 489 
U.S. at 599–600 (holding that the police actions constituted a seizure, but remanded the case 
to determine whether the seizure was unreasonable); Bouggess v. Mattingly, 482 F.3d 886, 
889 (6th Cir. 2007) (noting the reasonableness test set forth in Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 
7 (1985)); Thomas K. Clancy, The Future of Fourth Amendment Seizure Analysis After Hodari 
D. and Bostick, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 799 (1991) (noting that before the reasonableness 
question is determined, there must be a determination of whether a seizure has occurred); 
Ken Wallentine, How To Ensure Use of Force is “Reasonable and Necessary” and Avoid 
Claims of Excessive Force (Sept. 5, 2007), http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/ 
1271618-How-to-ensure-use-of-force-is-reasonable-and-necessary-and-avoid-claims-of-
excessive-force/ (citing Payne v. Pauley, 337 F.3d 767 (7th Cir. 2003)) (“An officer may use 
only that force which is both reasonable and necessary to effect an arrest or detention.”).  To 
dispel any confusion, unreasonable use of force and excessive force are essentially the same 
Pratt: The Fourth Amendment's Shortcomings for Police During School Shoo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
1114 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
purpose of the Fourth Amendment is to safeguard individuals from 
“arbitrary invasions by governmental officials.”81  As a result, an 
individual’s expectations of privacy are weighed against the 
government’s interest of preventing crime.82  In balancing these interests 
and fashioning reasonableness standards, the Court remains 
conscientious of three basic principles:  workability, reasonability, and 
objectivity.83 
The Supreme Court’s first critical decision regarding a police 
officer’s liability for the use of deadly force was Tennessee v. Garner.84  In 
Garner, the Court considered the constitutionality of deadly force by a 
police officer to prevent the escape of an unarmed burglar.85  Justice 
                                                                                                             
because excessive force has been defined as those actions “[o]utside of what is considered 
‘reasonably necessary’ under statutory provisions . . . .”  KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at 5.  
Despite this, the author gives his own definition of reasonable force as “that force the 
officer, by necessity, needs to use in order to gain control and maintain control of a subject, 
or defend a life, based on the common sense factors and any training the officer has 
received.”  Id. at ix (emphasis removed). 
81 DIMITRAKOPOULOS, supra note 77, at 365 (citing United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 
U.S. 543, 554 (1976)).  “The evil toward which the Fourth Amendment was primarily 
directed was the resurrection of the pre-Revolutionary practice of using general warrants 
or ‘writs of assistance’ to authorize searches for contraband by officers of the Crown.”  Id. at 
365  (citing United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1977); Boyd v. United States, 116 
U.S. 616, 624–29 (1886)). 
82 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985) (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 
703 (1983); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 700 n.12 (1981); Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 654 (1979); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 555 (1976)).  See also 
DIMITRAKOPOULOS, supra note 77, at 397 (noting that the balancing of these interests is the 
key principle to the Fourth Amendment); Clancy, supra note 80, at 799 (citing United States 
v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Prouse, 440 U.S. 648; Terry v. Ohio 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). 
83 DIMITRAKOPOULOS, supra note 77, at 389, n.247–49 (citing Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 
765, 772–73 (1983)). 
84 471 U.S. 1 (1985).  In Garner, Cleamtee Garner brought a wrongful death suit against 
the Memphis Police Department after their officers shot and killed his son, Edward Garner 
(“Garner”).  Id. at 4.  At approximately 10:45 p.m., Memphis police officers were dispatched 
to respond to a suspected burglary.  Id. at 3.  Upon arrival, Officer Hymon (“Hymon”) went 
behind the house and saw an individual run across the backyard.  Id.  Using a flashlight, 
Hymon was able to see Garner’s face and hands, but no sign of a weapon.  Id.  While 
Garner was crouched next to the fence, Hymon yelled, “police, halt” and walked towards 
Garner.  Id. at 4.  As Hymon advanced, Garner began to climb over the fence.  Id.  
Convinced that Garner would escape, Hymon decided to shoot, and the bullet hit Garner in 
the back of the head.  Id.  Garner died from his injuries at the hospital.  Id. 
85 Id. at 3.  The Federal District Court for the Western District of Tennessee entered 
judgment for the defendants, concluding that Hymon’s actions were authorized by the 
Tennessee statute, which was also deemed constitutional.  Id. at 5.  The Court further found 
Hymon’s actions to be “the only reasonable and practicable means of preventing Garner’s 
escape.  Garner had recklessly and heedlessly attempted to vault over the fence to escape, 
thereby assuming the risk of being fired upon.”  Id. (internal quotations omitted).  The Sixth 
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed with regard to Hymon, but remanded the issue of 
possible city liability because Monell v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Social Servs,, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), 
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White, writing for the majority, concluded that “such force may not be 
used unless it is necessary to prevent the escape and the officer has 
probable cause to believe that the suspect poses a significant threat of 
death or serious physical injury to the officer or others.”86  The Court 
reasoned that it was better for all felony suspects to escape than to die, 
especially when the suspect posed no immediate threat to the officer or 
others.87  As a result, the Tennessee statute was found unconstitutional 
as applied.88  However, it was not unconstitutional on its face because 
                                                                                                             
had been handed down after the district court’s decision.  Id.  The district court concluded 
that its prior decision was unaffected, but the court of appeals reversed and remanded the 
case.  Id. at 6.  The court of appeals concluded that the Tennessee statute was 
unconstitutional reasoning that the killing of a fleeing suspect constituted a seizure under 
the Fourth Amendment and therefore must be deemed reasonable.  Id. 
86 Garner, 471 U.S. at 3.  Finding the individual’s rights outweighed the government’s, 
the Court rejected the following arguments proposed by the government and the dissent:  
(1) overall violence will be reduced because suspects will not flee if they know they will be 
shot; (2) the Fourth Amendment must be construed in light of the commonlaw rule, thus 
police should be allowed to use whatever force is necessary against a felon; and (3) the 
shooting was justified because the officer had probable cause to believe that Garner had 
committed a burglary.  Id. at 9, 12, 21.  The Court concluded that these arguments were 
invalid because (1) shooting a nonviolent suspect is not a justifiable reason to use deadly 
force, (2) a large number of police departments and state statutes do not allow for deadly 
force when preventing the escape of a suspected felon, (3) the legal and technological 
advancements do not justify the reliance upon the common-law rule, (4) many of the 
crimes formerly punishable by death no longer exist, and (5) a suspected burglar, without 
regard to other circumstances, should not automatically justify deadly force.  Id. at 10–11, 
13–14, 21. 
87 Id. at 11.  The Court noted: 
It is no doubt unfortunate when a suspect who is in sight escapes, but 
the fact that the police arrive a little late or are a little slower afoot does 
not always justify killing the suspect.  A police officer may not seize an 
unarmed, nondangerous suspect by shooting him dead. 
Id.  See also Andrew T. George, Comment, Rediscovering Dangerousness:  The Expanded Scope 
of Reasonable Deadly Force After Scott v. Harris, 93 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 145, 146 (2007), 
available at http://virginialawreview.org/inbrief.php?s=inbrief&p=2007/07/09/george 
(discussing Tennessee v. Garner, suggesting that it was “a case of the right Constitutional 
rule wrongly applied”). 
88 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11.  The Tennessee Statute provides: 
(a) A law enforcement officer, after giving notice of the officer's 
identity as an officer, may use or threaten to use force that is 
reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of an individual 
suspected of a criminal act who resists or flees from the arrest. 
(b) Notwithstanding subsection (a), the officer may use deadly force to 
effect an arrest only if all other reasonable means of apprehension have 
been exhausted or are unavailable, and where feasible, the officer has 
given notice of the officer's identity as an officer and given a warning 
that deadly force may be used unless resistance or flight ceases, and: 
(1) The officer has probable cause to believe the individual to be 
arrested has committed a felony involving the infliction or threatened 
infliction of serious bodily injury; or 
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where an officer has probable cause to believe the suspect posed a threat 
of serious physical harm to officers or others, deadly force is reasonable 
to prevent escape.89  Therefore, the Court noted that it must decide 
“whether the totality of the circumstances justified a particular sort of 
search or seizure.”90  Determining reasonableness and the appropriate 
analysis under this test posed problems for lower courts.91  As a result, 
the test was clarified three years later in Graham v. O’Connor.92 
In Graham, the Supreme Court determined “what constitutional 
standard governs a free citizen’s claim that law enforcement officials 
used excessive force in the course of making an arrest, investigatory stop, 
or other ‘seizure’ of his person.”93  Justice Rehnquist, writing for the 
                                                                                                             
(2) The officer has probable cause to believe that the individual to 
be arrested poses a threat of serious bodily injury, either to the officer 
or to others unless immediately apprehended. 
(c) All law enforcement officers, both state and local, shall be bound by 
the provisions in this section and shall receive instruction regarding 
implementation of this section in law enforcement training programs. 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982). 
89 Garner, 471 U.S. at 11. 
Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer with a weapon or there is 
probable cause to believe that he has committed a crime involving the 
infliction or threatened infliction of serious physical harm, deadly force 
may be used if necessary to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, 
some warning has been given. 
Id. at 11–12. 
90 Id. at 8–9. 
91 See Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593, 594 (1989) (reporting that the district court 
granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss because using a roadblock during a high-speed 
pursuit was reasonable under the circumstances; a divided panel for the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed); Plesko, Comment, supra note 75, at 466 (noting that because Garner is fact-
specific and is determined upon the reasonableness of the officer’s actions in light of the 
totality of the circumstances, confusion continued to plague the lower courts until Graham 
v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989)). 
92 490 U.S. 386 (1989). 
93 Id. at 388.  In this case, Dethorne Graham (“Graham”) sought damages for injuries 
sustained when an officer used force against him during an investigatory stop.  Id.  
Graham, a diabetic, felt the onset of an insulin reaction and asked his friend, William Berry 
(“Berry”), to drive him to a convenience store to buy some orange juice.  Id.  Berry agreed, 
but upon arriving and entering the store, Graham saw numerous people in the check-out 
line and as a result, hurried out of the store, requesting Berry to drive him to a friend’s 
house.  Id.  Seeing Graham leave the store in a hurry, Officer Connor (“Connor”) became 
suspicious and decided to follow Berry’s car.  Id. at 389.  A little distance down the road, 
Connor decided to perform an investigatory stop and Berry related to Connor that Graham 
was suffering from a “sugar reaction.”  Id.  Hearing this, Connor ordered Berry and 
Graham to remain where they were, while he determined if anything had occurred at the 
store.  Id.  When Connor returned to his car to call for backup, Graham exited the car, ran 
around it twice, and sat down on the curb where he passed out briefly.  Id.  Once backup 
arrived, the officers rolled Graham over and handcuffed him, all the while ignoring Berry’s 
pleas to get Graham some sugar.  Id.  The officers then lifted Graham up, carried him to 
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majority, held that such claims should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment’s objective reasonableness test, rather than the substantive 
due process standard of the Fourteenth Amendment.94  The Court 
reasoned that the Fourth Amendment provided more guidance than 
substantive due process by offering an “explicit textual source of 
constitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive 
                                                                                                             
Berry’s car, and placed him face down on the hood.  Id.  Graham regained consciousness 
and pleaded for the police to check his wallet for his diabetes decal, but the officers 
continued to ignore him and shoved his face in the hood.  Id.  The officers then grabbed 
Graham and threw him headfirst into the back of the patrol car.  Id.  Meanwhile, Graham’s 
friend brought some orange juice for him, but the officers refused to let Graham have it.  Id.  
Finally, Connor discovered that Graham had done nothing wrong at the convenience store 
and the officers drove him home.  Id.  As a result of this encounter, Graham suffered a 
broken foot, cuts on his wrists, a bruised forehead, an injured shoulder, and claims to have 
a loud ringing in his right ear.  Id. at 390. 
94 See id. at 388 (vacating the Fourth Circuit’s decision and remanding it for 
reconsideration under the proper Fourth Amendment standard).  As the court explained: 
Today we make explicit what was implicit in Garner’s analysis, and 
hold that all claims that law enforcement officers have used excessive 
force—deadly or not—in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or 
other “seizure” of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth 
Amendment and its “reasonableness” standard, rather than under a 
“substantive due process” approach. 
Id. at 395.  See also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (stating that when analyzing the 
reasonableness of a particular search or seizure, “it is imperative that the facts be judged 
against an objective standard”).  But see Graham, 490 U.S. at 399–400 (Blackmun, Brennan, & 
Marshall, JJ., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (determining that there 
appears to be no reason for deciding that “prearrest excessive force claims are to be 
analyzed under the Fourth Amendment rather than under a substantive due process 
standard” and deciding not to join “in foreclosing the use of substantive due process 
analysis in prearrest cases”).  At the original jury trial, the district court granted the 
defendant’s motion for a directed verdict after considering four factors.  Graham v. City of 
Charlotte, 644 F. Supp. 246, 248 (W.D.N.C. 1986). 
The factors to be considered in determining when the excessive use of 
force gives rise to a cause of action under § 1983 are identified as  
(1) The need for the application for the force. 
(2) The relationship between the need and the amount of the force 
that was used. 
(3) The extent of the injury inflicted. 
(4) Whether the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain 
and restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very 
purpose of causing harm. 
Id. (citing King v. Blankenship, 636 F.2d 70 (4th Cir.1980)).  In applying these factors, the 
district court found that the amount of force was appropriate under the circumstances, 
there was no discernable injury, and the force was not applied for the very purpose of 
causing harm, but instead was used to maintain order.  Id. at 248–49.  On appeal, the Fourth 
Circuit affirmed, finding that the district court had applied the correct legal standard, 
approving the four-factor test, and concluding that a jury could not find that force was 
unconstitutionally excessive.  Graham, 490 U.S. at 391. 
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governmental conduct.”95  With the proper standard established, the 
Court shifted its focus to the question of reasonableness.96 
In discussing reasonableness, the Court reaffirmed that the Fourth 
Amendment required a careful balancing between individual and 
governmental interests, noting that reasonableness cannot be precisely 
defined or mechanically applied.97  As a result, courts must be attentive 
to the facts and the circumstances of each case, noting the crime’s 
severity, the immediacy of the threat to others, and whether the 
individual is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest.98  In 
applying the test, the Court further reaffirmed that courts are to refrain 
from judging in hindsight or considering underlying intent or 
motivation.99  The Court reasoned that officers are often forced to make 
split-second decisions in tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving 
situations.100  Many of the principles in Graham were reaffirmed in the 
2007 opinion Scott v. Harris.101 
                                                 
95 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395. 
96 Id. at 396. 
97 Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 8 (1985); United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 
696, 703 (1983); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 559 (1979)). 
98 Id. (quoting Garner, 471 U.S. at 8–9) (considering the totality of the circumstances 
against the justifiability of the officer’s actions). 
99 Id. at 396–97 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 20–22) (reasoning that courts must judge the 
actions from the perspective of the reasonable officer on the scene, “rather than with the 
20/20 vision of hindsight”).  The Court noted that since the proper test is an objectively 
reasonable test, “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation 
out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s good intentions make an 
objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”  Id. at 397 (citing Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973)).  Thus, 
“[t]hat test [Johnson v. Glick test], which requires consideration of whether the individual 
officers acted in ‘good faith’ or ‘maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing 
harm,’ is incompatible with a proper Fourth Amendment analysis.”  Id.  See also Scott, 436 
U.S. at 137 (“[I]n evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment[,] the Court has 
first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions . . . .”); Troupe v. Sarasota 
County, 419 F.3d 1160, 1166–67 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Force regardless of the form directed to a 
driver . . . does not give rise to a due process deprivation claim unless it was exercised with 
‘a purpose to cause harm’ unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest.”) (quoting Landol-
Rivera v. Cruz Cosme, 906 F.2d 791, 796 (1st Cir. 1990)). 
100 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.  See Martin A. Swartz, The High-Speed Police Pursuit Decision, 
N.Y.L.J. 3, July 24, 2007 (recognizing that officers have to make difficult split-second 
decisions with no time for real deliberation); Travis N. Jensen, Note, Cooling the Hot Pursuit:  
Toward a Categorical Approach, 73 IND. L.J. 1277, 1280 (1998) (“[E]very police officer must 
perform what becomes a complex balancing test in the seconds before each decision to 
pursue.”). 
101 550 U.S. 372 (2007).  However, it has also been suggested that Scott v. Harris is a 
departure from precedent and is an expansion of the reasonableness test because it was 
distinguished from Garner and considered without directly applying Graham.  See George, 
supra note 87, at 147–49 & n.18. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/5
2010] Shortcomings in School Shootings 1119 
In Scott, the Court focused its attention on the threshold question of 
whether Deputy Scott’s actions violated the Fourth Amendment.102  
Specifically, the Court asked “whether a law enforcement official can, 
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, attempt to stop a fleeing 
motorist from continuing his public-endangering flight by ramming the 
motorist’s car from behind.”103  Justice Scalia, delivering the Court’s 
                                                 
102 Scott, 550 U.S. at 376.  The Court reasoned that qualified immunity was not the proper 
initial inquiry.  Id.  In Saucier v. Katz, the Court concluded that the initial inquiry must be 
whether a constitutional right was violated.  533 U.S. 194 (2001). 
In the course of determining whether a constitutional right was 
violated . . . a court might find it necessary to set forth principles which 
will become the basis for a holding that a right is clearly established.  
This is the process for the law's elaboration from case to case, and it is 
one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or 
nonexistence of a constitutional right as the first inquiry. 
Id. at 201.  Although relatively insignificant to the thesis of this Note, the Supreme Court 
recently receded from the two-prong test set forth in Saucier.  See Pearson v. Callahan, 129 
S. Ct. 808, 818 (2009) (holding that although Saucier’s two-step sequence for resolving 
qualified immunity claims is “often appropriate, it should no longer be regarded as 
mandatory”).  See also Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009) 
(discussing Pearson and qualified immunity).  Hassel proposes the following: 
 Addressing the problem of police violence, providing balance to 
doctrine overly protective of defendants, and simplifying the 
procedural morass that qualified immunity has created in excessive 
force cases requires a radical modification of the doctrine.  In excessive 
force cases, the doctrine should be modified to protect a defendant 
only when there has been a genuine change in the legal standard 
governing his actions—not merely an application of established 
doctrine to a somewhat new set of facts.  Currently, qualified 
immunity prevents liability if the defendant's actions do not violate 
clearly established law “of which a reasonable person would have 
known.”  Instead, the standard should be that the defendant will be 
liable unless his actions violate a newly developed legal standard.  In 
the excessive force context, the protection provided by the 
reasonableness standard of Fourth Amendment, in conjunction with 
this more limited defense based on a newly developed law, will 
provide ample protection for the reasonably mistaken officer and will 
make compensation for the victim possible. 
Id. at 119–20. 
103 Scott, 550 U.S. at 376.  “Put another way:  Can an officer take actions that place a 
fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death in order to stop the motorist’s flight from 
endangering the lives of innocent bystanders?”  Id.  In this case, a Georgia county deputy 
decided to pull Victor Harris (“Harris”) over for speeding, but upon the sight of flashing 
lights, Harris sped away.  Id.  During the chase, speeds exceeded eighty-five miles per 
hour.  Id. at 374–75.  After hearing about the chase over his radio, Deputy Timothy Scott 
(“Scott”) joined the pursuit.  Id. at 375.  During the pursuit, Harris pulled into a large 
parking lot and the police attempted to box him in, but before they could, Harris was able 
to escape by making a sharp turn and ramming into Scott’s car.  Id.  Scott then took over as 
the lead pursuit vehicle where he decided to terminate the chase by employing a Precision 
Intervention Technique (“PIT”) maneuver.  Id.  This maneuver would cause the fleeing 
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opinion, held that such actions were reasonable and did not violate the 
Fourth Amendment because the car chase posed a “substantial and 
immediate risk of serious physical injury to others[.]”104 
The Court began by distinguishing Scott from Garner.105  The Court 
first noted that “Garner did not establish a magical on/off switch that 
                                                                                                             
vehicle to spin out of control and terminate the pursuit.  Id.  After permission was granted 
by Scott’s supervisor, Scott decided not to perform the maneuver, but instead apply his 
push bumper to the back of Harris’ vehicle, causing Harris to lose control, leave the 
highway, overturn, and crash.  Id.  As a result, Harris was rendered a quadriplegic.  Id.  
After hearing the facts of the case, the Court determined that the best option was to view 
the dashboard video tape recording.  Id. at 378–79.  Although acknowledging that courts 
are required to view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving 
party, the Court noted that there was “an added wrinkle in this case” and since there were 
no allegations or indications of tampering, the Court concluded that it was proper to rely 
solely upon the videotape as an eyewitness.  Id. at 378–80 (recognizing that such an 
approach is appropriate when “opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is 
blatantly contradicted by the record”).  See Howard M. Wasserman, Video Evidence and 
Summary Judgment:  The Procedure of Scott v. Harris, 91 JUDICATURE 180, 182 (2008) 
(suggesting that video can replace an eyewitness, making live testimony and corroboration 
unnecessary, allowing courts to disregard testimony altogether even when considering a 
motion for summary judgment).  But see Erwin Chemerinsky, A Troubling Take on Excessive-
Force Claims, 43 TRIAL 74, 74 (2007) (viewing the use of videotapes as a “novel twist” on 
judges’ decision-making and a likely trend in the future). 
104 Scott, 550 U.S. at 386 (reversing the court of appeals’ decision to deny qualified 
immunity).  Harris brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming Scott’s actions were 
excessive and constituted an unreasonable seizure, thereby violating his Fourth 
Amendment rights.  Id. at 375.  In response, Scott filed a motion for summary judgment, 
claiming he was protected under the theory of qualified immunity.  Id.  “The District Court 
denied the motion, finding ‘there are material issues of fact on which the issue of qualified 
immunity turns which present sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury.’”  Id. 
(quoting Harris v. Coweta County, No. 3:01-CV-148-WBH, 2003 WL 25419527, at *6 (N.D. 
Ga. Sept. 3, 2003)).  The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district 
court’s decision to allow the case to proceed to trial because a reasonable jury could find 
that Scott’s actions violated Harris’ Fourth Amendment rights.  Id. at 376 (citing Harris v. 
Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 816 (11th Cir. 2005)).  “The Court of Appeals further 
concluded that ‘the law as it existed [at time of the incident], was sufficiently clear to give 
reasonable law enforcement officers ‘fair notice’ that ramming a vehicle under these 
circumstances was unlawful.’”  Id. (citing Harris v. Coweta County, 433 F.3d 807, 817 (11th 
Cir. 2005)).  See also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 202 (noting that in Anderson the Court emphasized 
that the right allegedly violated by an official must have been ‘clearly established’). 
It should not be surprising, therefore, that our cases establish that the 
right the official is alleged to have violated must have been “clearly 
established” in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense:  
The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable 
official would understand that what he is doing violates that right. 
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). 
105 Scott, 550 U.S. at 382–83.  Harris urged the case be analyzed under the Garner, 
reasoning that Scott’s actions constituted deadly force.  Id.  Citing Garner, Harris defined 
deadly as “any use of force which creates a substantial likelihood of causing death or 
serious bodily injury.”  Id. (quoting Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 19 (1985)).  Harris 
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triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions constitute 
‘deadly force.’”106  As a result, judges must still “slosh [their] way 
through the factbound morass of ‘reasonableness.’”107 
“Sloshing” its way through, the Court could not quantify the 
significant individual and government interests, and was instead 
compelled to consider the number of lives and their relative 
culpability.108  The Court concluded that Scott’s actions were reasonable 
because Harris could have severely injured or killed multiple individuals 
through his unlawful, reckless, and intentional acts.109  Using such 
                                                                                                             
urged that under Garner, certain preconditions must be met before justifying Scott’s actions:  
“(1) The suspect must have posed an immediate threat of serious physical harm to the 
officer or others; (2) deadly force must have been necessary to prevent escape; and (3) 
where feasible, the officer must have given the suspect some warning.”  Id.  Harris 
concludes that since Scott cannot satisfy these requirements, his actions were “per se 
unreasonable.”  Id. 
106 Id.  Rather, “Garner was simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s 
‘reasonableness’ test, . . .  to the use of a particular type of force in a particular situation.”  
Id.  Differentiating  between the facts, the Court noted that the “threat posed by the flight 
on foot of an unarmed suspect” was not “even remotely comparable to the extreme danger 
to human life posed by respondent in this case.”  Id.  Therefore, since the facts of this case 
differ from those in Garner, such preconditions are inapplicable.  Id. 
107 Id. at 384.  Consequently, “all that matters is whether Scott’s actions were reasonable.”  
Id.  The appropriate “inquiry should be viewed from the perspective of a reasonable officer 
on the scene, rather than with hindsight, and must allow for the fact that police officers are 
often forced to make split-second judgments in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and 
rapidly evolving.”  No Constitutional Violation in Car Chase Fatality, 25 NO. 9 MCQUILLIN 
MUN. L. REP. 4 (Sept. 2007).  See J. Michael McGuinness, Law Enforcement Use of Force:  The 
Objective Reasonableness Standards Under North Carolina and Federal Law, 24 CAMPBELL L. REV. 
201, 201 (2002) (stating that courts consider the facts of a particular case under the 
circumstances as they appear to the officer at the time of the arrest); Plesko, supra note 75, 
at 466 (determining reasonableness from the “perspective of a reasonable officer on the 
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”).  Applying any other test would 
prove problematic.  See Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205–06 (finding the Graham test problematic to 
officers because it does not always give a clear answer whether courts will deem officers’ 
actions to be excessive); Jensen, supra note 100, at 1291–92 (recognizing that individual 
officers must perform a complex balancing test in the seconds before each decision to act, 
often under the influence of potentially prejudicial factors). 
108 Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (quoting United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983)).  In 
balancing the two, the Court determined that it must “consider the risk of bodily harm that 
Scott’s actions posed to respondent [Harris] in light of the threat to the public that Scott 
was trying to eliminate.”  Id.  In doing so, the Court noted it was clear from the videotape 
that Harris’ actions imminently threatened the lives of pedestrians, civilian motorists, and 
officers involved in the pursuit, while Scott’s actions only posed a high threat of serious 
harm to Harris.  See id. 
109 Id. at 384. 
It was respondent [Harris], after all, who intentionally placed himself 
and the public in danger by unlawfully engaging in the reckless, high-
speed flight that ultimately produced the choice between two evils that 
Scott confronted. . . .  By contrast, those who might have been harmed 
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reasons, the Court impliedly resorted to the self-defense of others 
doctrine.110  Meanwhile, Harris continued to argue that alternative 
methods would have sufficed.111 
The Court rejected Harris’s arguments reasoning that officers need 
not hope for the best, nor create perverse incentives for suspects to 
accelerate their speed and recklessness.112  Instead, the Court noted a 
                                                                                                             
had Scott not taken the action he did were entirely innocent.  We have 
little difficulty in concluding it was reasonable for Scott to take the 
action that he did. 
Id.  It has also been noted that those who create the risk and jeopardize the lives of others 
should bear the risk of loss.  See Michael Douglas Owens, Comment, The Inherent 
Constitutionality of the Police Use of Deadly Force to Stop Dangerous Pursuits, 52 MERCER L. 
REV. 1599, 1600 (2001).  Owens argues that anytime a suspect flees from police, deadly force 
is justified because it warrants both tactical operations and an interest to society 
perspective.  Id.  “In short, the risks of injury or death from police pursuits should be upon 
the violators who, by their flight, create the risks, rather than upon the citizenry in 
general.”  Id.  But see Jensen, supra note 100, at 1278 (arguing that because of the inherent 
risk of death or bodily injury, high-speed pursuits over minor crimes and traffic violations 
are unacceptable). 
110 See Richard P. Shafer, Annotation, When Does Police Officer’s Use of Force During Arrest 
Become so Excessive as to Constitute Violation of Constitutional Rights, Imposing Liability Under 
Federal Civil Rights Act of 1871 (42 U.S.C.A. § 1983), 60 A.L.R. FED. 204 (1982) (discussing the 
standard for self-defense of others and citing cases to support the definition).  “[A] person 
is justified in using force likely to cause death or great bodily harm if one reasonably 
believed that such force was necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm to 
oneself or another.”  41 C.J.S. Homicide § 499 (2008).  See also CHARLES E. TORCIA, 
WHARTON’S CRIMINAL LAW § 124 (15th ed. 1993) (“[T]he officer or private person, in 
attempting to make an arrest, is performing a significant public function . . . and, if the 
resistance escalates to such a degree as to threaten his life, he may resort to deadly force as 
a matter or self-defense.”); 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 83 (2008) (“An officer's use of deadly force 
is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the suspect poses a significant threat of death or serious physical injury to the officer or 
others.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 103, at 75 (“In other words, the Court had to balance the 
officers' need to protect pedestrians and other drivers by stopping Harris's car against the 
risk of injuring Harris.”); McGuinness, supra note 107, at 216–17 (“A person may intervene 
and use force against another when it appears reasonably necessary in order to protect a 
third person from harm.”); Jensen, supra note 100, at 1294 (“Considering the risk to 
innocent third parties of death or serious bodily injury that accompanies each decision, 
police pursuit is a major public concern.”). 
111 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 385 (asking the rhetorical question: “Couldn’t the innocent public 
equally have been protected, and the tragic accident entirely avoided, if the police had 
simply ceased their pursuit?”); Plesko, supra note 75, at 478 (indicating that seventy percent 
of jailed suspects involved in a car pursuit would have slowed down if police had 
terminated the pursuit). 
112 The Court rejected the, reasoning that “police need not have taken that chance and 
hoped for the best.”  Scott, 550 U.S. at 385.  Consequently, the Court found it was certain 
that ramming Harris’ car would have ended the pursuit and immediately eliminated the 
risk, while ceasing pursuit would not certainly produce the same result.  Id. at 385–86.  
“Given such uncertainty, respondent might have been just as likely to respond by 
continuing to drive recklessly as by slowing down and wiping his brow.”  Id. at 385.  
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more sensible rule:  “[a] police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous 
high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders does 
not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the fleeing 
motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”113  Although the Court has 
defined and established reasonableness as the proper standard for 
Fourth Amendment excessive force claims, circuit courts have 
inconsistently followed this standard.114 
3. Circuit Court Inconsistency When Analyzing Excessive Force Claims 
“The time-frame is a crucial aspect of excessive force cases.”115  Even 
after Garner and Graham, appellate courts disagree about the time-frame 
of reasonableness.116  For instance, the First, Third, Sixth, and Ninth 
                                                                                                             
Furthermore, the Court reasoned, “[i]t is obvious the perverse incentives such a rule would 
create:  Every fleeing motorist would know that escape is within his grasp, if only he 
accelerates to 90 miles per hour, crosses the double-yellow line a few times, and runs a few 
red lights.”  Id.  See also Owens, supra note 109, at 1637 (commenting that cessation would 
only cause lawlessness and give criminals an incentive to push the limits). 
113 Scott, 550 U.S. at 386.  Justice Breyer, however, noted: 
I disagree with the Court insofar as it articulates a per se rule.  The 
majority states:  “A police officer’s attempt to terminate a dangerous 
high-speed car chase that threatens the lives of innocent bystanders 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment, even when it places the 
fleeing motorist at risk of serious injury or death.”  Ante, at 1779.  This 
statement is too absolute.  As Justice GINSBURG points out, ante, at 
1779–1780, whether a high-speed chase violates the Fourth 
Amendment may well depend upon more circumstances than the 
majority’s rule reflects. 
Id. at 389 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
114 See Eric S. Connuck, Constitutional Law:  The Viability of Section 1983 Actions in Response 
to Police Misconduct, 1990 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 747 (discussing the different standards 
applicable depending upon the status of the individual as either a pre-arrest detainee or 
pre-trial detainee); Mitchell J. Edlund, Note, In the Heat of the Chase:  Determining Substantive 
Due Process Violations Within the Framework of Police Pursuits When an Innocent Bystander is 
Injured, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 161, 161–68 (1995) (discussing the level of culpability necessary to 
invoke the protections of the Due Process Clause in police pursuit cases while discussing 
the varying approaches taken by lower federal courts); R. Wilson Freyermuth, Comment, 
Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987 DUKE L.J. 692, 694–95 (listing cases discussing the four 
factors set forth in Johnson v. Glick); Aaron Kimber, Note, Righteous Shooting, Unreasonable 
Seizure?  The Relevance of an Officer’s Pre-Seizure Conduct in an Excessive Force Claim, 13 WM. 
& MARY BILL RTS. J. 651, 665–75 (2004) (noting and discussing various federal circuit court 
decisions to alter the reasonableness test after Graham); Daniel O’Connell, Note, Excessive 
Force Claims:  Is Significant Bodily Injury the Sine Qua Non to Proving a Fourth Amendment 
Violation?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 739, 751 (1990) (demonstrating that courts have not 
uniformly applied Graham’s Fourth Amendment test); Shafer, supra note 110, at 204 
(discussing numerous cases regarding the reasonableness test). 
115 Plakas v. Drinski, 19 F.3d 1143, 1150 (7th Cir. 1994). 
116 See Grazier ex rel. White v. City of Philadelphia, 328 F.3d 120, 127 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(noting the circuit court’s split discussion in Abraham); Billington v. Smith, 292 F.3d 1177, 
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Circuits assess officer actions under a “totality of the circumstances” 
standard, while the Fourth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits review 
officer actions exactly when the seizure occurs.117  As a result of this 
                                                                                                             
1186–88 (9th Cir. 2002) (addressing the split between the First, Third, Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits); Abraham v. Raso, 183 F.3d 279, 291–92 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(discussing the court’s agreement with the First Circuit and its disagreement with the 
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits); Dickerson v. McClellan, 101 F.3d 1151, 1160–62 (6th 
Cir. 1996); St. Hilaire v. City of Laconia, 71 F.3d 20, 26 (1st Cir. 1995) (explaining the court’s 
disagreement with the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits); Schulz v. Long, 44 F.3d 643, 
649 (8th Cir. 1995) (discussing the court’s agreement with the Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and 
Tenth Circuits to disregard the events leading up to the seizure). 
117 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9 (1985).  The Third Circuit has determined that the 
totality of the circumstances standard set forth in Garner, was again appropriately applied 
in Brower.  See Abraham, 183 F.3d at 291 (noting that the Court in Brower used the totality of 
the circumstances to determine the officer’s reasonableness and concluded that doing so 
was appropriate).  This standard has been reaffirmed in the Third Circuit through 
numerous subsequent cases.  See, e.g., Hill v. Nigro, 266 F. App’x 219, 221 (3d Cir. 2008); 
Curley v. Klem, 499 F.3d 199, 207 (3d Cir. 2007); Kopec v. Tate, 361 F.3d 772, 776–77 (3d Cir. 
2004); Grazier ex rel. White, 328 F.3d at 127; Estate of Smith v. Marasco, 318 F.3d 497, 515 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  The First Circuit has also determined that the totality of the circumstances 
standard set forth by the Supreme Court is the proper analysis.  See Young v. City of 
Providence, 404 F.3d 4, 22 (1st Cir. 2005); St. Hilaire, 71 F.3d at 26 n.4 (“We do not read this 
case as forbidding courts from examining circumstances leading up to a seizure, once it is 
established that there has been a seizure.”).  The First Circuit also noted that it had previously 
made similar decisions in earlier cases.  St. Hilaire, 71 F.3d at 26. 
Instead of focusing solely on whether the officer who shot Hegarty 
was acting in self-defense at the moment of the shooting (Hegarty had 
picked up a rifle and raised it in the direction of the officers and 
ignored their demands to drop it), the court examined all of the actions 
of the officers to determine whether there was probable cause to arrest 
Hegarty and whether there were exigent circumstances to allow a 
forcible, warrantless, nighttime entry into her dwelling.  Id. at 1374–79.  
Similarly, in Roy v. Lewiston, this court examined all of the surrounding 
circumstances in determining whether the police acted reasonably:  
“Roy was armed; he apparently tried to kick and strike at the officers; 
he disobeyed repeated instructions to put down the weapons; and the 
officers had other reasons . . . for thinking him capable of assault.” 42 
F.3d at 695. 
Id. 26–27.  Similarly, the Sixth Circuit has also determined that considering the totality of 
the circumstances, not just the moments before the seizure, was appropriate when 
considering reasonableness.  See Claybrook v. Birchwell, 274 F.3d 1098, 1104–05 (6th Cir. 
2001).  But see Dickerson, 101 F.3d at 1162 (noting that in “reviewing the plaintiffs' excessive 
force claim, we limit the scope of our inquiry to the moments preceding the shooting.”).  
The Ninth Circuit has taken a slightly different approach, but nonetheless has concluded 
that courts should consider the totality of the circumstances.  See Billington, 292 F.3d at 1190 
(citing Duran v. City of Maywood, 221 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2000); Alexander v. City & 
County of San Francisco, 29 F.3d 1355 (9th Cir. 1994)) (finding that the initial inquiry 
should be whether the officer’s conduct would provoke a violent response, followed by a 
determination if such force was objectively reasonable). 
 In contrast, other courts only consider an officer’s actions at the moment the seizure 
occurs.  See, e.g., Bella v. Chamberlain, 24 F.3d 1251, 1256 (10th Cir. 1994); Cole v. Bone, 993 
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inconsistent standard, many law enforcement departments revised and 
altered their active shooter policies.118 
C. Law Enforcement’s Response to School Violence 
Within days after the Columbine shooting, law enforcement agencies 
across the country began scrutinizing and changing their rapid-response 
programs.119  These speedy changes were designed to prevent high 
                                                                                                             
F.2d 1328, 1333 (8th Cir. 1993); Carter v. Buscher, 973 F.2d 1328, 1332 (7th Cir. 1992); 
Greenidge v. Ruffin, 927 F.2d 789, 792 (4th Cir. 1991).  The Fourth Circuit noted that the 
focus of reasonableness must be on the conduct “at the moment when the decision to use 
certain force was made” and therefore, “excluding evidence of the officer's actions leading 
up to the time immediately prior to the shooting” was appropriate.  Greenidge, 927 F.2d at 
792 (internal quotations omitted).  The Seventh Circuit noted that “pre-seizure conduct is 
not subject to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.”  Carter, 973 F.2d at 1332.  Similarly, the Eighth 
Circuit affirmed this principle when it noted, “we scrutinize only the seizure itself, not the 
events leading to the seizure, for reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.”  Cole, 993 
F.3d at 1333 (citing Carter, 973 F.2d at 1332).  Two years later the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed 
that events leading up to the seizure should not be considered.  Schulz, 44 F.3d at 649.  
Finally, the Tenth Circuit again adopted this principle when it rejected an appellant’s claim 
that the court should examine all of the actions of the police officer up to the seizure.  Bella, 
24 F.3d at 1256.  See also Holland ex rel. Overdorff v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 1191 (10th 
Cir. 2001) (“The decision to use a SWAT team to make a ‘dynamic entry’ into a residence 
constitutes conduct ‘immediately connected with the seizure’ because it determines the 
degree of force initially to be applied in effecting the seizure itself.”); Medina v. Cram, 252 
F.3d 1124, 1132 (10th Cir. 2001) (“We emphasize, however, that, in order to constitute 
excessive force, the conduct arguably creating the need for force must be immediately 
connected with the seizure . . . .”); Sevier v. City of Lawrence, 60 F.3d 695, 699 (10th Cir. 
1995) (“The reasonableness of Defendants’ actions depends both on whether the officers 
were in danger at the precise moment that they used force and on whether Defendants' 
own reckless or deliberate conduct during the seizure unreasonably created the need to use 
such force.”).  But see Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 841 (10th Cir. 1997) (noting 
that that the officers' conduct prior to the use of force could be included in the 
reasonableness inquiry). 
118 See infra Part II.C (discussing law enforcement’s response to school violence). 
119 See Timothy Harper, Shoot to Kill, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Oct. 2000, at 28, available at 
http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2000/10/harper.htm (discussing the Peoria, Illinois 
Police Department’s new tactics and noting that most of the nation’s 17000 police agencies, 
especially the 2000 agencies with fifty or more officers, have instituted new training 
programs in the last year). 
The day after Columbine, municipal officials and police chiefs across 
the nation asked their SWAT team leaders, “If it had happened here, 
what would have been the result?”  They received answers similar to 
the one that Sergeant Jeff Adams, a longtime SWAT team leader and 
trainer in Peoria, gave:  “The same thing would have happened here.” 
Id.  See also Lisa Backus, Shooter Exercises Help Police Sharpen Response (May 25, 2008), 
http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/1698404-Shooter-exercises-help-police-
sharpen-response/ (noting that after the shootings at Columbine, officers cannot wait for 
the SWAT team); Shelby County Officers Drill for Potential School Shootings (Apr. 4, 2002), 
http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/50373-Shelby-County-Officers-Drill-for-
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casualties in school shootings and to avoid potential wrongful death 
lawsuits filed by victims’ families due to officer inaction.120  
Consequently, “Columbine almost immediately became a seminal event 
in the history of police training and tactics.”121 
Part II.C.1 reviews traditional police active shooter policies, 
revealing the passivity of traditional policies.122  Conversely, Part II.C.2 
discusses the current trend in active-shooter policies and the aggressive 
techniques being used to counter school violence.123 
1. Traditional Police Policies 
Traditionally, the first officers to respond to an active shooter never 
rush into a confrontation.124  Instead, they were trained to secure the area 
                                                                                                             
Potential-School-Shootings/ [hereinafter Shelby County Officers Train] (noting more than 
fifty officers in central Indiana, including the Indiana State Police troopers, received this 
training). 
120 See, e.g., Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054 (10th Cir. 2004); Ireland v. Jefferson County 
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1201 (D. Colo. 2002); Rohrbough v. Stone, 189 F. Supp. 2d 
1144 (D. Colo. 2002); Sanders v. Acclaim Entm’t, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (D. Colo. 2002); 
Castaldo v. Stone, 192 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Colo. 2001); Rohrbough v. Stone, 189 F. Supp. 
2d 1088 (D. Colo. 2001); Ruegsegger v. Jefferson County Bd. of County Comm’rs, 197 F. 
Supp. 2d 1247 (D. Colo. 2001); Ruegsegger v. Jefferson County School Dist. R-1, 187 F. 
Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Colo. 2001); Sanders v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of County of Jefferson, 
192 F. Supp. 2d 1094 (D. Colo. 2001); Schnurr v. Bd. of County Comm’rs of Jefferson 
County, 189 F. Supp. 2d 1105 (D. Colo. 2001); Harris v. Denver Post Corp., 123 P.3d 1166 
(Colo. 2005); Blesch v. Denver Pub. Co., 62 P.3d 1060 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Bodelson v. 
Denver Pub. Co., 5 P.3d 373 (Colo. Ct. App. 2000).  See also Harper, supra note 119 (“Glick 
acknowledges that the fear of lawsuits is one factor behind the new tactics.”); Wallentine, 
supra note 80 (noting tremendous potential liability comes with each use of force); Ron 
Avery, Tactical Decision Making:  An Equation for Critical Thinking in Moments of Crisis 
(May 9, 2007), http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/1243796-Tactical-decision-
making-An-equation-for-critical-thinking-in-moments-of-crisis/ (posing the question 
“How often is legal liability the overwhelming factor in decision making, to the exclusion 
of situational needs or overall mission?”).  Schools may also be subject to liability for 
student deaths.  See Brett A. Sokolow et al., College and University Liability for Violent Campus 
Attacks, 34 J.C. & U.L. 319 (2008); Ben “Ziggy” Williamson, Note, The Gunslinger to the Ivory 
Tower Came:  Should Universities Have a Duty to Prevent Rampage Killings?, 60 FLA. L. REV. 
895, 898 (2008) (discussing “whether universities should have a duty to identify and thwart 
students that pose a threat to the lives of other students” and “ultimately reject[ing] the 
application of a Tarasoff-like duty to protect in the context of university rampage killings”). 
121 Harper, supra note 119. 
122 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing traditional police policies regarding school shootings). 
123 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing contemporary police policies regarding school 
shootings). 
124 See Harper, supra note 119 (“The traditional police response was designed for dealing 
with trapped bank robbers, angry husbands, or disgruntled employees—not with 
disaffected teenagers running through a school killing as many people as possible.”); Todd 
Johnson, Milwaukee Police Department Tactical Enforcement Team:  Patrol Response to the 
Active Shooter Instructor Manual 2 (unpublished manual, on file with The Valparaiso 
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by establishing a perimeter around the scene to contain the suspect.125  
Meanwhile, SWAT teams were notified.126  Upon arrival, the SWAT 
teams were given command over the situation, and all tactical operations 
were under their authority.127  Even if an officer did enter the building 
and came upon the suspect holding a gun to a hostage’s head, they were 
taught to comply with the suspect’s demands.128  Now, however, with 
the pressures of litigation and continuing violence in schools, many 
officers are being trained to use tactics, typically reserved for specialists, 
in an attempt to neutralize the risk quickly.129 
                                                                                                             
University Law Review) [hereinafter MPD Training Manual] (stating that traditional 
methods were focused on isolating and containing the suspect). 
125 See Backus, supra note 119 (revealing that traditional methods consisted of setting up a 
perimeter and waiting for the SWAT team to arrive); Harper, supra note 119. 
126 See Harper, supra note 119. 
127 See id.  “The SWAT team arrived, assumed positions to keep the suspects pinned 
down, and negotiated with them until they surrendered.  SWAT teams stormed buildings 
only when necessary to save lives, such as when hostages were being executed one by 
one.”  Id. 
128 See Harper, supra note 119.  “When he came upon the suspect holding the gun to the 
hostage’s head, Layman’s initial impulse was to drop his gun.  ‘That’s what you were 
always taught—drop the gun, just like on the TV shows[.]’”  Id. 
129 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing new police policies to neutralize the risk).  But see Mike 
Baird, Texas Police are Taught When to Use Deadly Force:  Officers Learn to Use Guns at Last 
Resort, Nov. 24, 2003, http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/72870-Texas-Police-
Are-Taught-When-to-Use-Deadly-Force/ (discussing training requirements for Corpus 
Christi police officers and noting that officer training should focus on decision-making and 
teaching officers that deciding when to use deadly force is just as important as teaching 
them when not to use it).  However, this decision-making skill is difficult to attain when 
officers have minimal training requirements and do not comply with national standards.  
See Backus, supra note 119 (noting that officers only spent four hours participating in active 
shooter situations and all the police departments will have to participate in the four hour 
training); Lise Olsen & Cindy George, Houston Police Training Faces More Changes, June 2, 
2008, http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/1700712-Houston-police-training-faces 
-more-changes/ (stating that the Houston Police Department requires officers to use the 
firing range once a year, the state’s minimum requirement, other larger cities require two 
attendances per year, and the national guidelines mandate four times per year; therefore, if 
officers would like additional training they must purchase their own ammunition and 
“compete for range time”). 
Interestingly, one of the side effects of these new tactics is increased levels of stress.  
See First Shot Hits, supra note 14 (discussing the effects of stress on a police officer’s 
competency to react to his surroundings); New Findings About Simulation Training and Post-
Shooting Interview Stress, Jan. 2, 2007, http://www.policeone.com/writers/columnists/ 
force-science/articles/1197958/ [hereinafter New Findings about Stress] (noting the effects 
stressful situations have upon memory). 
We all know that excessive stress affects the awareness sections of the 
brain negatively, and the expected performance deteriorates rapidly in 
relation to the stress level experienced.  The subconscious mind on the 
other hand will instantly increase its perceptive ability under stress, 
like when under live fire, and work hundreds of times faster than the 
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2. Contemporary Police Policies 
Although SWAT teams may still be used, the current objective of 
thousands of police departments across the country is to neutralize the 
shooter.130  Rather than establish a perimeter and secure the area, the first 
four to five officers on the scene form a “contact team.”131  Once 
                                                                                                             
awareness sections of the brain.  The subconscious mind will also, 
whether we want so or not, override any previous behavior pattern or 
training stored in the awareness section of the brain when under 
extreme stress.  This means that any training of the awareness sections 
of the brain will more or less be non-existent when the subconscious 
mind takes over in a live shoot-out. 
First Shot Hits, supra note 14. 
130 See Harper, supra note 119 (“Their sole purpose is to move right to the shooter and 
stop him, using whatever force is necessary,” and are instructed to “take the shot if you 
have it.”) (internal quotations omitted); Shelby County Officers Train, supra note 119 (“The 
quicker you can get in there and neutralize the situation, the better.”) (internal quotations 
omitted); City of Racine Police Department Policy and Procedure, Rapid Deployment 
Policy 1 (June 8, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with The Valparaiso University 
Law Review) [hereinafter RPD Policy] (noting the purpose is “to safe guard innocent 
individuals who otherwise may suffer great bodily injury or death without immediate 
police intervention.”); MPD Training Manual, supra note 124, at 1 (stating that the objective 
is to “[s]uccessfully perform proper team movement and room clearing techniques while 
moving rapidly through the facility in an effort to locate, isolate, or engage the ‘Active 
Shooter.’”).  Whereas in the past SWAT experts were trained to neutralize the shooter, now 
police officers “are being taught to enter a building if they are the first to arrive at the 
scene, to chase the gunman, and to kill or disable him as quickly as possible.”  Harper, 
supra note 119. 
131 See RPD Policy, supra note 130, at 1 (discussing the proper procedure upon receiving a 
complaint).  The officer involved should perform the following duties: 
1. Advise the Communications of the current status of the situation 
until relieved by a Supervisor.  Attempt to confirm the situation 
as an Active Shooter situation. 
2. Attempt to confine and/or contain the situation until additional 
support arrives. 
3. As directed by the on-scene Supervisor become a member of the 
following; 
a. Contact Team. 
b. Search and Rescue Team. 
c. Security Team. 
4. Attempt to effect the arrest(s) necessary as part of your duties as 
assigned by the on-scene Supervisor. 
Id.  See also Burdi, supra note 14 (discussing traditional methods, including establishing a 
perimeter, and the modern trend of officers being trained to actually “confront or diffuse a 
violent situation”); Harper, supra note 119; Ohio Trainer Makes the Case for Single-Officer 
Entry Against Active Killers, May 14, 2008, http://www.policeone.com/writers/ 
columnists/Force-Science/articles/1695125-Ohio-trainer-makes-the-case-for-single-officer-
entry-against-active-killers/ [hereinafter Single-Officer Entry Against Active Killer] (noting 
that an assembly of three or more officers is recommended, but also advocating for single-
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assembled, they enter into a diamond formation and move through the 
school quickly, searching for the shooter and ignoring wounded 
individuals.132  When contact is made with the shooter, officers are to 
disable the shooter by any means necessary, regardless of hostages.133 
The main concern in these situations is time.134  The theory is that by 
having the contact team pursue the gunman, he will be under pressure 
to keep moving, thus preventing him from controlling a particular 
populated area and killing many people.135  Moreover, the gunman’s 
attention will be diverted to the officers, and innocent bystanders will be 
protected.136 
In conclusion, school violence plagues American schools, despite 
numerous attempts by Congress, schools, and states to reduce it.137  
                                                                                                             
officer entries); Shelby County Officers Train, supra note 119 (stating that this training will 
teach officers arriving on the scene how to react). 
In addition to aggressive techniques, the Indianapolis Police Department has issued 
twenty of their officers M-16 Rifles.  See Indy Police Train to Use M-16 Rifles, Dec. 1, 2004, 
http://www.policeone.com/training/articles/94089-Indy-Police-Train-to-Use-M-16-
Rifles/ [hereinafter Indy Police Use M-16 Rifles].  The police department reasons that doing 
so will give officers more options when faced with specific situations in which such 
weaponry could be used.  Id. 
132 See Harper, supra note 119 (noting that a second diamond formation may be used in 
larger buildings; one team pursuing the shooter and the other rescuing bystanders and 
wounded); MPD Training Manual, supra note 124, at 4, 12–16 (noting the first priority is to 
“locate, isolate, capture and/or neutralization of the suspect, as soon as possible” and 
discussing the proper formations).  However, at least one other police department uses a T-
formation, which consists of three officers across the front and one in the rear.  See Backus, 
supra note 119. 
133 Harper, supra note 119 (noting that police departments are training officers to shoot 
because if they do not, the hostage is likely to die regardless).  “Most of the gunman’s body 
was shielded by the hostage, but Layman did not hesitate.  He took the shot.  Blue paint 
exploded against the gunman’s helmet. . . . His clean head shot ended the exercise.”  Id.  
However, before shooting, experts suggest officers consider lighting conditions, whether 
the subject is moving or standing still, distance, whether the sights on the firearm have 
been sighted in recently, how “fat” the front sight is, the type of position the officer is in, 
time pressures, what is behind the target in case of a miss, and whether the officer is 
stationary or moving.  Avery, supra note 120. 
134 See Harper, supra note 119 (noting it typically takes three to four minutes for officers to 
arrive on the scene, while it takes on average thirty to sixty minutes for a SWAT team to 
organize and arrive); Paul Howe, Officer Survival:  Use-of-Force (Dec. 1, 2007), 
http://www.policeone.com/policemarksman/32-6/1667745-Officer-Survival-Use-of-
Force/ (noting that in large cities, SWAT teams may take thirty to forty minutes to respond 
to an emergency; thus police officers “need to be authorized and empowered to act, and 
their training levels need to be elevated to meet the threats that they face”). 
135 Harper, supra note 119 (noting that the Columbine shooters seized the school library 
and were able to kill and wound most of their victims). 
136 See id. (“[G]unmen are less likely to fire at innocent bystanders if they are shooting at 
pursuing police officers.”). 
137 See supra Part II.A (discussing the current trends in school violence). 
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Although most remedies promote safety by providing additional 
funding to participating schools that comply with safety standards, 
many of these remedies have failed.138  Coupled with the threat of 
litigation for inaction, police departments have been forced to change 
their active shooter policies.139  While the public has generally been 
receptive of these new policies, these policies have not yet been 
challenged and could lead to excessive force claims if an officer acts 
unreasonably.140  Because of the inconsistencies among appellate courts 
and the imprecise nature of reasonableness, police officers could act 
unreasonably.141 
III.  ANALYSIS 
While congressional acts, state statutes, schools, and police 
departments have tried to remedy school shootings or provide police 
officers guidance, courts have rarely assisted.142  Instead, police 
departments have been left with an ambiguous reasonableness test and 
little direction on how to apply it in school environments.143  As a result, 
they have created unclear policies that may infringe upon the shooter’s 
rights.144  In order to protect these police departments from liability and 
deter school violence, courts need to create a bright-line rule that gives 
greater deference to police departments responding to school 
shootings.145  This is particularly important because previously proposed 
alternatives have proven inadequate.146 
Part III.A analyzes the problems with previous approaches taken to 
remedy school violence.147  Part III.B examines the problems with 
                                                 
138 See supra notes 54–63 and accompanying text (discussing surveys revealing security 
continued problems at schools). 
139 See supra note 120 and accompanying text (noting cases where police departments 
were sued). 
140 See Harper, supra note 119.  “So far rapid-response training has encountered little 
public opposition, but Klinger expects that will change the first time the police kill a 
suspect instead of capturing him, or the first time an officer firing at a suspect hits an 
innocent person instead.”  Id. 
141 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the inconsistent application of the reasonableness test 
among lower courts). 
142 See supra Part II.A (discussing actions taken by these entities). 
143 See supra Part III.B (setting forth the background of the reasonableness test). 
144 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing contemporary police policies). 
145 See infra Parts III.A–C (discussing problems with previous remedies and the inherent 
problems with the current reasonableness test). 
146 See supra Part II.A (discussing congressional acts, state statutes, and school remedies). 
147 See infra Part III.A (discussing the problems with previous attempts to remedy school 
violence). 
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applying a reasonableness test.148  Finally, Part III.C considers the 
problems posed by new nationwide police policies.149 
A. Problem 1:  Previous Approaches to Remedy School Violence Are Too 
Preventative 
At least four authoritative entities have attempted to remedy school 
violence by proposing and implementing legislation or strict policies.150  
These bodies include:  Congress, state legislatures, schools, and other 
governmental agencies, such as the FBI, Secret Service, and Department 
of Education.151  The remedies posed by these organizations are 
individually flawed, but the common underlying defect is the 
preventative nature of the remedies.152 
Congress has attempted to address school violence through multiple 
congressional bills and statutes, many of which provide additional 
financial aid to schools implementing security measures.153  Because 
many of Congress’s attempts were proposed by leading national 
organizations and were preventative, they lack a substantial deterrent 
mechanism.154  Strong deterrents are essential because preventative 
measures may deter small risks, but they will not discourage individuals 
determined to evade those measures.155  In fact, without strong 
                                                 
148 See infra Part III.B (discussing the problems the reasonableness test creates innately, 
for officers, and for courts). 
149 See infra Part III.C (discussing the problems the contemporary police policies create). 
150 See supra Part II.A (discussing previous proposals to remedy school violence and their 
ineffectiveness). 
151 See supra Part II.A (discussing previously proposed remedies). 
152 See supra notes 29–49, 54–63 and accompanying text; infra notes 153–73 and 
accompanying text (discussing the faults of previous remedies). 
153 See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text (discussing the statutes Congress has 
passed and the bills proposed by congressmen). 
154 See supra note 29 (noting two national organizations lobbying and petitioning in 
Congress). 
155 See Maxwell, supra note 2.  “Mr. Thomas acknowledged that keeping a determined, 
armed intruder out of schools may be impossible . . . .”  Id.  However,  
Mr. Cornell of the University of Virginia, who advises school 
administrators on security issues, cautioned policymakers and 
educators against measures to “fortify” schools, such as installing 
metal detectors and hiring police or armed security officers to patrol 
them.  Those features tend to become more a pacifier than a panacea, 
he said.  “That should be the last resort,” he said.  “Remember, in the 
school shooting at [Red Lake Indian Reservation in Minnesota], the 
first person to get shot was the school security officer.” 
Id.  Moreover, the Luke Woodham, a sixteen-year-old student gunman told a federal 
education official “in an interview that a metal detector or police officer on duty would not 
have stopped his rampage.”  Id.  See also 2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58, at 7 (noting 
the ability to gain access to schools is easy). 
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deterrents the likelihood of school shootings might increase because 
schools become easy targets.156  Similar to congressional statutes, state 
legislation has been too preventative in nature.157 
Preventative measures created by state legislation are faulty because 
increasing penalties for weapons on school grounds reduces only the 
occurrence of firearms on school grounds, not violence on school 
grounds.158  Similar to congressional statutes, state zoning laws make 
schools more vulnerable because perpetrators, believing the school is 
unarmed, become more inclined to attack.159  While arming teachers with 
concealed weapons has received mixed reviews by parents and school 
officials, it provides a defense and deterrent against perpetrators.160  This 
leads to the implementation of prevention-oriented strategies by the 
third entity—schools.161 
Schools typically use zero-tolerance policies to threaten and prevent 
school violence.162  While reactionary, these policies resemble 
preventative measures created by congressional and state zoning laws.163  
                                                 
156 See Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, supra note 49 (noting it was not until the 
federal government starting making schools gun-free zones that these types of school 
shootings have started to occur).  In order to prevent the school from being an easy target, 
one school district has approved teachers to carry firearms.  Id. 
157 See infra notes 158–61 and accompanying text (discussing the problems with state 
legislation). 
158 See supra notes 38–43 and accompanying text (discussing examples of state statutes 
implemented to deter weapon possession on school grounds).  See also Maxwell, supra note 
2 (noting that fortifying schools with metal detectors and enhanced security will only act as 
a “pacifier [rather] than a panacea”). 
159 This was the logic of one school district in Texas that allowed teachers to carry 
concealed weapons if they were certified and passed all the requirements established by 
the school district.  See Texas School District OKs Pistols for Staff, supra note 49; Texas Students 
Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48.  “When you outlaw guns in a certain area, 
the only people who follow that are law-abiding citizens, and everybody else ignores it[.]”  
Texas Students Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48.  A similar logic was behind 
the 500 colleges and universities across the country that have purchased training programs 
teaching professors and students to fight back with improvised weapons, such as a 
backpack or laptop computer.  See Zagier, supra note 48 (noting that the training teaches 
students to be aware of surroundings and to use laptops or backpacks as weapons). 
160 See Texas Students Pack Bookbags; Teachers Pack Heat, supra note 48 (parent commenting 
that with the length of time it takes for police to arrive, arming teachers at least provides 
some sort of defense). 
161 See infra notes 162–67 and accompanying text (discussing the problems school 
programs create). 
162 See supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (discussing prevalence of zero-tolerance 
policies). 
163 Compare supra notes 45–49 and accompanying text (discussing zero-tolerance policies 
and the preventative nature to deter weapon possession), with supra notes 30–36 and 
accompanying text (discussing Congress’s school zoning laws, punishments imposed upon 
students, and safety requirements imposed upon schools receiving federal financial aid, all 
of which are intended to deter and prevent school violence), and supra notes 37–43 and 
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School policies are impractical because they impose small punishments 
on students and do not deter students who intend to commit violent 
acts.164  In other words, they only deter gun possession and not the active 
use of that gun.165  In addition, they also share the same over-inclusive, 
inflexible, and ineffective characteristics exhibited in threat assessment 
programs.166  With regard to deterrence, zero-tolerance policies fall 
between proposed legislation and the threat assessment programs 
created by the FBI, Secret Service, and Department of Education.167 
The FBI, Secret Service, and Department of Education threat 
assessment programs provide weak deterrents because they attack 
school violence only indirectly and have a high risk of error.168  Their 
over-inclusiveness and high-risk tendencies stem from misidentifying 
the risky behaviors, the rarity of such events, and the low predictability 
of similar future events.169  While assessing threats are important in 
determining initial security measures, the costs and risks of wrongly 
accusing someone are great, particularly when numerous factors and 
multiple types of threats are taken into consideration.170  As a result, 
                                                                                                             
accompanying text (discussing state school zoning laws and varying punishments imposed 
upon violators, which are intended to deter and prevent school violence). 
164 See supra notes 30–43, 54–63 and accompanying text (noting the punishments imposed 
upon violators and the survey results indicating the ineffectiveness of such measures). 
165 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (noting at least one student who admitted a 
metal detector or police officers would not have deterred his actions). 
166 Compare Armistead, supra note 44 (noting that non-negotiable punishment can be 
inappropriate and ineffective because “[p]ossession of a butter knife and possession of a 
switchblade . . . automatically receive the same punishment”), and supra notes 45–49 and 
accompanying text (discussing problems with zero-tolerance in schools and the tendency 
to be over-inclusive and speculative), with infra notes 168, 170 and accompanying text 
(discussing the FBI, Secret Service, and Department of Education’s threat assessment 
factors and the speculative nature of checklists). 
167 Compare supra notes 30–43 and accompanying text (discussing proposed legislation by 
Congress and states and the strong preventative nature of these measures), with infra notes 
168–71 and accompanying text (discussing the unreliable and high risk characteristics). 
168 See generally FEIN ET AL., supra note 12; O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 2; POLLACK ET AL., 
supra note 28; VOSSEKUIL ET AL., supra note 28. 
 One response to the pressure for action may be an effort to 
identify the next shooter by developing a “profile” of the typical school 
shooter.  This may sound like a reasonable preventative measure, but 
in practice, trying to draw up a catalogue or “checklist” of warning 
signs to detect a potential school shooter can be shortsighted, even 
dangerous.  Such lists, publicized by the media, can end up unfairly 
labeling many nonviolent students as potentially dangerous or even 
lethal. 
O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 2. 
169 See O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 2–3. 
170 See id.  See also supra notes 29, 168 and accompanying text (discussing factors to 
consider and the risk of over-inclusiveness).  Moreover, 
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threat assessments are the weakest deterrent because they are 
disconnected from school violence and provide a complex, fact-sensitive 
calculation.171 
Despite problems with preventative measures, they are useful 
because school violence is often a conglomeration of factors for which a 
single solution does not exist.172  Imprisonment, police action, and police 
presence may still be the greatest deterrents available, but imposing a 
reasonableness test in school shootings is problematic.173 
B. Problem 2:  Interpreting and Applying the Reasonableness Test 
Police officers are charged with enforcing the law, and traditionally 
courts give them deference.174  However, § 1983 limits police officers’ use 
of force and holds them accountable to a reasonableness standard.175  
Under the current test, an individual must establish the two-prongs set 
                                                                                                             
[t]hreats can be classed in four categories:  direct, indirect, veiled, or 
conditional.  A direct threat identifies a specific act against a specific 
target and is delivered in a straightforward, clear, and explicit manner:  
“I am going to place a bomb in the school’s gym.”  An indirect threat 
tends to be vague, unclear, and ambiguous.  The plan, the intended 
victim, the motivation, and other aspects of the threat are masked or 
equivocal:  “If I wanted to, I could kill everyone at this school!”  While 
violence is implied, the threat is phrased tentatively—“If I wanted to” 
—and suggests that a violent act COULD occur, not that it WILL occur.  
A veiled threat is one that strongly implies but does not explicitly 
threaten violence.  “We would be better off without you around 
anymore” clearly hints at a possible violent act, but leaves it to the 
potential victim to interpret the message and give a definite meaning 
to the threat.  A conditional threat is the type of threat often seen in 
extortion cases.  It warns that a violent act will happen unless certain 
demands or terms are met:  “If you don’t pay me one million dollars, I 
will place a bomb in the school.” 
O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 7. 
171 See supra notes 168–70 and accompanying text (discussing the weaknesses of threat 
assessment). 
172 Just as threats cannot be resolved by a single solution, governing bodies are correct in 
not applying a single solution to resolve school violence.  If this did happen, then they 
would blindly follow the fallacy created by “Abraham Maslow:  ‘If the only tool you have 
is a hammer, you tend to see every problem as a nail.’  Every problem is not a nail, of 
course, and schools must recognize that every threat does not represent the same danger or 
require the same level of response.”  O’TOOLE, supra note 28, at 5. 
173 See generally 2004 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58; 2003 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58; 
2002 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 58; 2001 NASRO SURVEY, supra note 54 (discussing how 
threats have continued to persist).  See also infra Part III.B.2 (discussing problems for officers 
in applying reasonableness). 
174 See supra Parts II.B.1–2 (discussing the evolution of police action from the common 
law to the reasonableness test). 
175 See supra note 16 for text of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  See also supra Part II.B (defining excessive 
force). 
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forth in Graham.176  Despite the test’s apparent clarity, it is actually 
convoluted and poses problems for lower courts and police officers.177 
Part III.B.1 analyzes the problems with the imprecise reasonableness 
test set forth by the Supreme Court.178  Part III.B.2 discusses the problems 
this creates for police officers.179  Part III.B.3 considers the problems 
facing lower courts.180 
1. The Reasonableness Test 
First defined in Tennessee v. Garner,181 the reasonableness test 
provided that if an officer had probable cause to believe the suspect 
posed a threat of serious physical harm to officers or others, deadly force 
was reasonable to prevent escape.182  This test was expanded in Graham 
v. Connor.183  Whereas Garner was a narrow holding, only applying to 
cases where individuals posed danger while fleeing, Graham expanded 
the standard to all excessive force claims.184  Graham impliedly became 
the standard, with Garner as an illustration of that standard, but not until 
Scott v. Harris185 did such notions come to fruition.186 
                                                 
176 See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text (discussing the two-prong test 
established in Graham, which asks whether a seizure occurred, and if so, whether the acts 
were reasonable).  This Note does not discuss the first prong of the test; whether a seizure 
has occurred.  See supra notes 94–101 (discussing the second prong and the Court’s decision 
in greater detail). 
177 See infra Parts III.B.1–3 (discussing the innate problems with the reasonableness test, 
the problems this creates for police officers during school shootings, and the problems this 
creates for lower courts). 
178 See infra Part III.B.1 (discussing the innate problems with the reasonableness test). 
179 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing the problems a reasonableness test creates for police 
officers during school shootings). 
180 See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the problems this creates for lower courts). 
181 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985). 
182 See supra note 89 and accompanying text (quoting the language used by the Court). 
183 490 U.S. 386 (1989).  See supra notes 94–101 and accompanying text (discussing the 
reasonableness standard). 
184 Compare Garner, 471 U.S. at 22 (noting that the statute was not invalid on its face, and 
was only invalid with the acts purportedly authorized in this case), with Graham, 490 U.S. at 
388 (holding that any claim brought against a law enforcement official in the “course of 
making an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of his person[,]” had to be analyzed 
under the Fourth Amendment objective reasonableness test).  See also George, supra note 87, 
at 146 (noting the Court took a narrow view and approach in Tennessee v. Garner). 
185 550 U.S. 372 (2007). 
186 See infra notes 187–208 and accompanying text (discussing the 
distinguishing of Scott and Garner). 
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Scott dramatically changed the relatively clear reasonableness 
definition.187  In Scott, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion attacked the 
notion that Garner was “the test” for reasonable deadly force with regard 
to a fleeing suspect.188  Justice Scalia explained “that several of Garner’s 
preconditions for deadly force [were] merely an application of the 
Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness inquiry and not a ‘magical on/off 
switch that triggers rigid preconditions whenever an officer’s actions 
constitute deadly force.’”189  As a result, Garner is not the test, but rather 
an example of the reasonableness test.190  The Court distinguished Scott 
from Garner and distanced it from Graham.191 
Graham has been thrust to the forefront in determining the 
reasonableness of a police officer’s actions.192  As such, it would have 
been logical for the Court in Scott to discuss Graham.193  However, the 
Court did not apply Graham, signaling a distancing from that 
precedent.194  Instead, the Court focused primarily upon the cost-benefit 
analysis of the officer’s actions, coupled with the perpetrator’s 
culpability and danger posed to bystanders.195  This further indicates 
distancing because it implies that police officers and courts must 
consider a fourth factor, dangerousness, whereas Graham only discussed 
three.196  This cost-benefit analysis is relatively new to Fourth 
                                                 
187 See generally George, supra note 87, at 148 (arguing Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in 
Scott was a direct attack on the standard set forth in Garner, while ignoring the standards 
set forth in Graham). 
188 Id.  Justice Scalia factually distinguished Garner and Scott primarily on the danger 
posed to bystanders.  See id. 
189 Id.  (quoting Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007)) (internal quotations omitted). 
190 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380 (citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (“Garner was 
simply an application of the Fourth Amendment’s ‘reasonableness’ test”)); George, supra note 
87, at 148 (noting that Scott reduced Garner to little more than an example). 
191 See supra notes 75–77, 94; infra notes 192–208 and accompanying text (discussing the 
distinguishing between Scott and Graham). 
192 See supra note 94 and accompanying text (noting Graham’s applicability to all excessive 
force cases).  See also George, supra note 87, at 149 n.18 (noting that “Graham purported to 
apply to all use-of-force cases, with which Garner specifically did not deal”). 
193 See George, supra note 87, at 145, 149 n.18 (noting that it was surprising that the Court 
did not discuss, let alone not apply Graham v. Connor). 
194 See generally Scott, 550 U.S. 372 (only noting that Graham stood for the proposition that 
a violation of the Fourth Amendment must be based upon objective reasonableness).  See 
also George, supra note 87, at 149 n.18 (suggesting the avoidance of applying Graham 
equates to a distancing of Scott and Graham). 
195 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85. 
196 Compare George, supra note 87, at 149 (proposing and noting that “for all future cases 
the door is now open to a new conception of dangerousness, under which a court may no 
longer ignore dangerousness from flight as a Fourth Amendment reasonableness factor”), 
with Graham v. Conner, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989) (noting that reasonableness “requires 
careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the 
severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/5
2010] Shortcomings in School Shootings 1137 
Amendment analysis.197  Because Scott did not discuss Garner or Graham, 
and instead carved out its own independent rule granting greater 
deference to police officers, it appears that the Court has started to revert 
back to common law notions.198 
As previously noted, under common law, officers were allowed to 
commit any and all necessary actions to prevent a felon from escaping.199  
Garner contradicted this by carving out an exception, which provided 
that officers could not use deadly force to merely detain a felon, but Scott 
reverts by adopting that any police actions are justified if the suspected 
felon is dangerous.200  In adopting this position, there are very few 
situations where a suspected felon could be seen as non-dangerous, 
especially when the Court agreed the “paramount governmental 
interest” was ensuring public safety.201  The Court also used 
dangerousness to justify no requirement for alternative methods.202 
By rejecting the alternative means argument, police officers were 
given greater deference because they can use all the force that is 
                                                                                                             
of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest by flight”). 
197 Compare Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85, and George, supra note 87, at 151 (noting that “the 
question of when deadly force should be used is a matter of policy, beyond the question of 
what is permissible under the Fourth Amendment”), with Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (noting 
the three factors to be used in determining reasonableness without noting culpability or the 
benefits to society), and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (focusing only on the 
costs and threats to police officers and innocent bystanders without considering culpability 
or the benefits afforded to society). 
198 See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text (discussing the common law standard 
for the use of force).  See also infra notes 199–208 and accompanying text (discussing the 
implicit reversion back to the common law standard). 
199 See supra notes 75–77 and accompanying text (discussing the common law standard 
for the use of force). 
200 Compare Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–14 (rejecting the government’s contention that officer’s 
should be judged under the common law officers and use “whatever force was necessary to 
effect the arrest of a fleeing felon,” while also rejecting the old policy that fleeing felons 
were dangerous), with Scott, 550 U.S. at 384 (noting that Harris posed “an actual and 
imminent threat to the lives of any pedestrians who might have been present, to other 
civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase”). 
201 Scott, 550 U.S. at 384.  See George, supra note 87, at 146 (“[T]here is no such thing as a 
completely nondangerous [sic] fleeing suspect, because even nondangerous [sic] people are 
capable of becoming quite dangerous when desperately  trying to escape.”).  Moreover, 
“[s]ociologists have noted that flight-induced panic can cause seemingly harmless people 
to set aside social norms in order to escape harm, including, for example, parents who 
abandon young children to escape a life threatening crisis.”  Id. at 147 (citing E. L. 
Quarentelli, The Sociology of Panic, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL AND 
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 11021 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2002). 
202 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85 (noting that officers did not have to justify not using 
alternative means because of the dangerous actions occurring); infra notes 203–07 and 
accompanying text (discussing the use of alternative methods and hoping for the best). 
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necessary and “certain to eliminate the risk[.]”203  By using this language, 
the Court again reverted to common law because many types of force 
may be certain to eliminate the risk, including less intrusive means, but 
those are not required under the analysis.204  This contradicts Garner 
because Garner impliedly required the use of less restrictive means and 
rejected common law arguments offered by the government.205  
Consequently, the Court claims reasonableness was used, but in reality, 
common law principles were applied.206  As a result, police officers may 
have difficulty assessing their actions during school shootings.207 
2. Problems for Police Officers in Applying Reasonableness 
Police officers applying the aforementioned reasonableness test may 
encounter problems because of time constraints; a constant, rapidly 
changing environment; and differing individual reasonableness 
standards—that is, each officer has his own perception of 
reasonableness, thus creating a lack of uniformity.208 
Although the Court recognized that officers are under time 
constraints, the reasonableness test’s numerous factors are problematic 
                                                 
203 Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85 (emphasis added in original). 
204 Compare Garner, 471 U.S. at 12 (noting that  under the common law rule, officers were 
“allowed the use of whatever force was necessary to effect the arrest of a fleeing felon, 
though not a misdemeanant”), and id. at 12 (“As stated in Hale’s posthumously published 
Pleas of the Crown:  ‘[I]f persons that are pursued by these officers for felony or the just 
suspicion thereof  . . .  shall not yield themselves to these officers, but shall either resist or 
fly before they are apprehended or being apprehended shall rescue themselves and resist 
or fly, so that they cannot be otherwise apprehended, and are upon necessity slain therein, 
because they cannot be otherwise taken, it is no felony.’ 2 M. Hale, Historia Placitorum 
Coronae 85 (1736).”) (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *289)), with Scott, 
550 U.S. at 383–85 (finding the officer’s actions justified and “certain to eliminate the risk”). 
205 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 12–16.  The Court noted that when the common law rule was 
created, all felonies were punishable by death, whereas today many felonies are not.  Id. at 
13.  Moreover, the common law developed when the weapons were rudimentary, and 
therefore deadly force was safer than hand-to-hand combat.  Id. at 14.  As a result of these 
policies, the Court rejected the government’s contentions, and instead, impliedly adopted 
the position that alternatives should have been used or even the perpetrator’s escape 
would have been better.  Id. at 11. 
206 Compare Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (noting the reasonableness test 
should be applied to all excessive force claims), and Garner, 471 U.S. at 3 (applying the 
reasonableness test and impliedly requiring the use of alternative methods before deadly 
force), with Scott, 550 U.S. at 383–85 (finding the officer’s actions reasonable, although 
deferring to his actions and allowing him to use any force “certain to eliminate the risk,” 
without the requirement of alternatives). 
207 See infra Part III.B.2 (discussing problems officers encounter when a convoluted 
reasonableness test is used). 
208 See infra notes 209–30 and accompanying text (discussing problems for officers). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/5
2010] Shortcomings in School Shootings 1139 
in these situations.209  Rather than creating a bright-line rule like the rule 
in Scott, officers must weigh the three factors set forth in Graham and the 
fourth factor added by Scott.210  While many officers may reach the same 
conclusions about the proper amount of force, any time a balancing test 
exists, there is a chance of error or worse yet, indecision and hesitation, 
which can lead to death.211 
To remedy these time pressures, the Court previously noted that 
police actions must be judged from the officer’s viewpoint when the 
seizure occurs; not with 20/20 hindsight.212  While helpful in 
determining reasonableness and giving greater deference to police 
                                                 
209 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 384–85 (noting that officers must make split-second decisions, 
therefore they need a sensible and easy to apply rule); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (recognizing 
that officers must make split-second decisions); Jensen, supra note 99, at 1280 (“[E]very 
police officer must perform what becomes a complex balancing test in the seconds before 
each decision to pursue.”); Swartz, supra note 99 (officers have to make difficult split-
second decisions with no time for real deliberation). 
210 See generally Scott, 550 U.S. at 382–83, (noting that dangerousness was an important 
factor); Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (discussing three factors the Court must consider in 
determining all reasonableness inquiries under Fourth Amendment excessive force claims).  
See also George, supra note 87, at 151 (proposing that the Court has adopted a 
dangerousness factor that must be included in determinations of reasonableness, and 
noting that “Scott v. Harris is an important step towards recognizing that this danger from 
flight can be equally relevant to a reasonableness calculation as the danger from continued 
freedom.”). 
211 See Baird, supra note 129 (“[E]ach deadly force incident is different and the force 
continuum is only a guide that combines with an officer’s level of training, education[,] and 
experience on the streets. . . . At some point there’s a realization of risk, and hesitancy on 
the part of some officers has cost them their lives.”). 
212 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20–22 (1968)) (noting 
that courts must judge the actions from the perspective of the reasonable officer on the 
scene, “rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight”).  The Court noted that since the 
proper test is an objectively reasonable test, “[a]n officer’s evil intentions will not make a 
Fourth Amendment violation out of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an 
officer’s good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of force constitutional.”  Id. 
at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 138 (1978); United States v. Robinson, 414 
U.S. 218 (1973)).  Thus, “[t]hat test [Johnson v. Glick test], which requires consideration of 
whether the individual officers acted in ‘good faith’ or ‘maliciously and sadistically for the 
very purpose of causing harm,’ is incompatible with a proper Fourth Amendment 
analysis.”  Id. at 397.  See also Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 137 (1978) (“[I]n 
evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the Court has first undertaken an 
objective assessment of an officer's actions”); Troupe v. Sarasota County, 419 F.3d 1160, 
1166–67 (11th Cir. 2005) (“Force regardless of the form directed to a driver . . . does not give 
rise to a due process deprivation claim unless it was exercised with ‘a purpose to cause 
harm’ unrelated to the legitimate object of arrest.”). 
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officers, it will not remedy indecision or hesitation.213  A constant, 
rapidly changing environment can also lead to similar problems.214 
Balancing tests are detrimental to officers in constant, rapidly 
changing environments because each time the situation changes, the 
officer must reassess his actions.215  This is dangerous in quickly evolving 
situations where officers cannot keep up with reassessments because 
hesitation can lead to unreasonable actions and even death.216  Stress can 
also hinder a police officer’s reassessment abilities.217 
Stress can cause officers to become unresponsive and forget their 
surroundings.218  If an officer becomes unresponsive and has a single-
track mind in an evolving situation, he may act unreasonably because 
                                                 
213 See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of indecision or 
hesitation and noting the deadly consequences, which, of course, cannot be reversed 
because once somebody is dead, nothing can bring them back to life). 
214 See infra notes 215–17 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of rapidly 
changing events). 
215 Although the following is only an example of a training exercise, it is representative of 
how quickly a school shooting can evolve and change. 
His ears ringing from gunfire, his uniform damp with sweat, his breath 
labored and acrid-tasting from the gunpowder in the air, Officer Larry 
Layman ran heavily down a hallway toward an insistent pop-pop-pop. 
A gunman was running through a school shooting children, and 
Layman was chasing him. Layman rounded a corner, holding his gun 
in front of him with two stiff arms, and stopped dead. The gunman 
stood facing him, with an arm around a hostage's neck and a gun held 
to the hostage's head. “Drop your gun or I'll blow his head off!” the 
gunman screamed. Layman, a police officer for more than half his fifty 
years, had been trained always to drop his gun at a moment like this. 
Now he fired. 
Harper, supra note 119.  Although courts grant deference to police officers in these 
situations, they must still attempt to reassess the reasonableness of their actions.  See 
Graham, 490 U.S. at 395–99.  If this was not expected of officers, then the Court would not 
have adopted a balancing test that is subject to change if the facts change, but rather could 
have adopted a mechanical rule.  Id.  See also PATRICK, supra note 63, at 97 (noting that 
officers “must continuously assess the actions of the subject and the effects of the force 
being used to decide whether the next step on the ladder can be taken.  The officers must 
also continuously consider lesser alternatives of force to know when to de-escalate.”). 
216 See KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at ix (proposing for the implementation of simple tests in 
deadly force situations); Baird, supra note 129 (suggesting that as a situation evolves or 
changes the amount of appropriate force also changes, noting that “each deadly force 
incident is different and the force continuum is only a guide that combines with an officer’s 
level of training, education[,] and experience”).  But see Avery, supra note 120 (noting good 
officers can use balancing tests almost subconsciously and will have refined critical 
thinking skills, but suggesting that those without practice or experience may be slower in 
assessing situations).  See also supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting the effects of 
indecision, hesitation, and error). 
217 See infra notes 218–21 and accompanying text (discussing the physiological effects of 
stress and unreasonable actions that can occur). 
218 See supra note 129 (discussing the unresponsiveness of officers in stressful situations). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 44, No. 4 [2010], Art. 5
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol44/iss4/5
2010] Shortcomings in School Shootings 1141 
the situation has changed, while his mindset and the force he thinks is 
reasonable has not.219  This is also problematic because if stress slows 
reactions, the officer cannot perform the multi-factored reasonableness 
test quickly.220  Finally, varying standards of reasonableness between 
individual police officers can be problematic.221 
Often an officer’s reasonableness standards will be similar to that of 
other officers, but not always.222  For example, what is reasonable to a 6’ 
5” police officer weighing 240 pounds will not necessarily be reasonable 
to a 5’ 10” police officer weighing 150 pounds because what intimidates 
one officer might not threaten another.223  This is especially important 
when considering the mental distress associated with school shootings 
because if officers have differing individual reasonableness standards 
when placed in non-stressful situations, they will likely have differing 
reasonableness standards when placed in stressful situations.224  This 
may also lead to predictability problems and the inability to gauge a co-
officer’s actions, which are necessary in situations requiring teamwork.225  
Confusion, hesitation, and errors, all of which can endanger innocent 
bystanders and fellow officers, may occur without teamwork.226  For the 
aforementioned reasons, officers must have a bright-line rule similar to 
                                                 
219 See supra note 129 (discussing the unresponsiveness of officers in stressful situations). 
220 See supra note 215–16 and accompanying text (discussing the need for officers to 
continuously reassess deadly force situations). 
221 See infra notes 222–28 and accompanying text (discussing differing standards of 
reasonableness for individuals). 
222 See Wallentine, supra note 80. 
Ask a dozen people when “reasonable and necessary force” to effect an 
arrest or detention becomes “excessive force” and you will likely get a 
dozen different answers, none of them particularly helpful in 
measuring the proper amount of force. Several people may ultimately 
question an officer’s use of force and each one may have a different 
idea of how to decide whether the force was excessive. 
Id. 
223 See KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at viii (noting the flexibility needed in police policies, 
rather than generic standards, and illustrating this point with a similar example between a 
5’2” officer and a 6’2” officer).  See also supra note 222 (noting differing answers to 
reasonableness). 
224 See supra note 218 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of stress on a police 
officer’s competency to surroundings). 
225 See supra notes 131–33 and accompanying text (discussing the methods and teamwork 
skills needed to execute the new tactics implemented by police departments). 
226 See also supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting the effects of indecision, 
hesitation, and error). 
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the rule carved out in Scott.227  An easy-to-apply rule will also assist 
lower courts.228 
3. Problems for Lower Courts in Applying Reasonableness 
The greatest problem facing lower courts is when to begin applying 
the reasonableness test.229  This inconsistency is problematic because if 
lower courts do not know when to begin their inquiries, then an officer’s 
actions may be decided incorrectly.230  This poses greater problems for 
police officers than courts because court decisions can be reversed, 
whereas an officer’s decision to use deadly force, and the consequences 
of that action, cannot.231 
When lower courts apply an inconsistent standard, police 
departments can be misled or confused as to the proper standard.232  This 
can cause police officers to act incorrectly and endanger themselves or 
others.233  Realizing this, new policies instruct officers to use deadly force 
almost immediately, but this too can be problematic.234 
C. Problem 3:  New, Unclear Police Policies 
New police policies implemented around the country force police 
officers to act more aggressively than they are accustomed.235  Although 
police departments are trained to fire upon active shooters in crowded 
and chaotic areas, this is problematic because they are not specialists.236  
In fact, they often receive limited training and if they want additional 
                                                 
227 See generally Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (discussing the Supreme Court’s easy 
to apply rule).  See also infra Part IV (discussing an easy to apply rule that may be beneficial 
to police officers). 
228 See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing the problems lower courts have with the application of 
the reasonableness test). 
229 See supra Part II.B.3 (discussing the inconsistency among lower courts). 
230 See supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text (discussing the different time frames 
courts have applied when determining the reasonableness of an officer’s actions). 
231 See supra note 213 and accompanying text (discussing the reversibility of court 
decisions, but not police actions). 
232 This is why many police departments hire attorneys or professional organizations in 
attempts to determine whether a department’s protocols are legally sound.  See Wallentine, 
supra note 80. 
233 See supra note 211 and accompanying text (noting the effects of indecision, hesitation, 
and error). 
234 See infra Part III.C (discussing the problems with contemporary police policies). 
235 Compare Part II.C.2 (discussing new aggressive police tactics), with Part II.C.1 
(discussing traditional passive police tactics). 
236 See supra notes 126–27 (discussing SWAT tactics and their specialized training). 
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practice, they must do it on their own.237  This means that strategies 
traditionally reserved for specialists, must now be implemented by 
amateurs.238  While risky, these policies are momentarily socially 
acceptable and justified upon principles of utilitarianism.239  Despite 
societal support, the policies' broad, vague language is problematic.240 
Broad, vague language can easily be misinterpreted or misapplied, 
especially in rapidly changing environments.241  Although the language 
itself can be deceiving, it poses greater problems for officers because the 
language appearing in new policies, which gives police officers 
deference, is the same language courts used under common law.242  
Recalling that the Court expressly rejected this language in earlier cases, 
there now appears to be a gap between the reasonableness test courts are 
instructed to apply and the protocols officers are trained to use.243  This 
                                                 
237 See supra note 129 (discussing the limiting training many officers receive).  But see 
Harper, supra note 119. 
At the same time, he says, he’s glad he had the training.  “Even the 
thought of it is terrifying, but as long as the nuts are out there, we have 
to prepare for them,” he says.  He would welcome more training, but 
doubts that his department, or any other, can adequately train every 
single police officer for a Columbine-style shooting.  “The new training 
doesn’t come close to what would be needed,” he says.  “To be really 
prepared for something like that, we would need to be trained almost 
weekly.” 
Id. 
238 See supra Part II.C.2 (noting that officers must use deadly force, regardless of whether 
they are comfortable or agree with doing so). 
239 See supra note 140 and accompanying text (noting the public’s current acceptance of 
the new police tactics). 
240 See infra notes 241–44 and accompanying text (discussing the language contained in 
these new police policies). 
241 See Harper, supra note 119 (noting that the Peoria Police Department’s “sole purpose is 
to move right to the shooter and stop him, using whatever force is necessary”); MPD 
Training Manual, supra note 124, at 4, 7, 15 (noting the contact team’s goal is to neutralize 
the situation); RPD Policy, supra note 130, at 2 (noting the contact team should “[i]nitiate 
entry to the building or location to eliminate the threat, i.e. arrest, deadly force, response, 
etc.”). 
242 Compare supra notes 132–33 and accompanying text (discussing the new police tactics), 
and Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108(a) (1982)) 
(the Court rejected language in the Tennessee Statute that provided a police officer may use 
or threaten to use force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of an 
individual suspected of a criminal act who resists for flees from the arrest), with Tennessee 
v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 12 (1985) (noting the common law allowed police to use whatever 
force was necessary). 
243 For a discussion of the language the Court has adopted and rejected, see generally 
Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (adopting the objective reasonableness test for all 
excessive force claims); Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (rejecting the common law language of whatever 
force was necessary). 
 For a discussion of the apparent gap between the language adopted by police 
departments and the language adopted by courts, compare Harper, supra note 119 (noting 
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means police, though believing their actions are justified, may be held 
liable because they relied upon their policies.244 
As a result of the aforementioned problems, a bright-line test must 
be articulated to grant police departments greater deference during 
school shootings and protect them from liability.245  In turn, such a rule 
will reduce school violence because:  it is not preventative in nature; 
restricts the use of a multi-factored reasonableness test, thus allowing 
consistent applications by courts and police officers; and allows police 
officers to comply with the new policies without fearing liability. 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
This Note suggests two proposals for reducing school violence.  
First, while optional financial assistance helps prevent school violence, it 
does not do so substantially, thus mere reliance upon it should be 
avoided.  Second, the reasonableness test adopted by the Supreme Court 
should include an exception for school shootings, which would create a 
bright-line test for police officers’ use of force and bridge the gap 
between officer training and Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Both of 
these proposals create strong deterrents against individuals considering 
committing school shootings by preventing weaker-willed individuals 
from executing their plans and ending the plans of stronger-willed 
individuals early. 
Part IV.A discusses reducing the reliance upon optional preventative 
measures and proposes that such measures be mandated.246  Part IV.B 
proposes that a bright-line test be created for school shootings, thus 
replacing the reasonableness test in these situations.247 
                                                                                                             
that the Peoria Police Department’s “sole purpose is to move right to the shooter and stop 
him, using whatever force is necessary”); MPD Training Manual, supra note 124, at 4, 7, 15 
(noting the contact team’s goal is to neutralize the situation); RPD Policy, supra note 130, at 
2 (noting the contact team should “[i]nitiate entry to the building or location to eliminate 
the threat, i.e. arrest, deadly force, response, etc.”), with Graham, 490 U.S. at 388 (adopting 
the objective reasonableness test for all excessive force claims); Garner, 471 U.S. at 13 
(rejecting the common law language of whatever force was necessary). 
244 See KINNAIRD, supra note 64, at vii (noting that some officers’ actions were justified 
under the law, but those officers did not understand the ramifications of their department’s 
policies or that the policy did not protect them from liability). 
245 See infra Part IV (suggesting a proposed rule that will reduce school violence, while 
affording police departments greater protection from liability). 
246 See infra Part IV.A (proposing mandatory preventative measures replace optional 
preventative measures). 
247 See infra Part IV.B (proposing a bright-line test replace the reasonableness test only in 
school shootings). 
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A. Reducing Reliance Upon Optional Preventive Measures and Financial 
Assistance to Cure School Violence 
In general, preventative measures help reduce school violence by 
deterring less-determined individuals.248  To make them more effective, 
however, legislatures must reduce reliance solely on optional 
preventative measures and financial assistance to cure school violence.249  
Instead, governing bodies must mandate preventative measures because 
optional preventative measures implemented by Congress, state 
legislatures, schools, and other entities are insufficient.250  The problem 
with optional preventative measures is they allow school officials 
discretion to conduct a cost-benefit analysis and determine the need for 
such measures.  This means that if the costs of improvements exceed the 
amount of financial aid received from such improvements, officials 
would likely forego improvements altogether because the meager 
budget would not allow it.  Mandatory preventive measures would turn 
out different. 
Mandatory school security improvements force school officials to 
comply with safety requirements without any discretion, thus allowing 
legislatures to fine school districts that fail to comply.  While additional 
financial assistance can persuade compliance for some school districts, as 
shown above, the incentives are not always greater than the cost.  
Therefore, the best remedy is imposing punishments on schools not in 
compliance.  This creates a strong deterrent, while also maximizing the 
use of preventive measures in schools and curbing school violence.  In 
essence, just as strong deterrents prevent students from committing 
violent acts, so too will strong deterrents encourage schools to enhance 
their security. 
In addition to creating a deterrent, the benefits of mandating 
preventive measures are three-fold.  First, violence by less-determined 
shooters will be reduced.  Second, officials could not use the budget or 
other financial issues as an excuse for not implementing preventative 
measures.  Finally, mandating school compliance allows exposure to 
liability under the tort of negligence.251 
                                                 
248 See supra Part III.A (discussing the positives and negatives of preventative measures). 
249 See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text (discussing problems with optional 
preventative measures and financial assistance provided by legislatures). 
250 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing perpetrator’s claim that medical 
detectors would not have been enough). 
251 This Note recognizes legislatures are unlikely to adopt such a statute, but theoretically 
it is possible.  See generally Hanks, supra note 30, at 1–6 (noting student violence in schools, 
tort law liability, and immunity granted by states). 
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In conclusion, while preventative measures might not deter stronger-
willed shooters, they will reduce some violence.  For those shooters not 
deterred by preventative measures, officers must resort to deadly force 
as the only remaining deterrent.252  The problem is that current Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence does not always allow police officers the 
unfettered discretion needed to achieve their goals, thus an exception 
must be created.253 
B. Creating a Bright-Line Rule for School Shootings 
The second proposal creates a bright-line rule for police officers by 
eliminating the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness test.  Under the 
current test, courts and officers must consider the severity of the crime, 
the immediacy of the threat posed by the suspect to officers and others, 
whether the individual is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade 
arrest, the dangerousness of the suspect’s actions, and the culpability of 
the individuals involved.254  Under this proposal, if an apparent 
necessity to use deadly force existed, police officers would automatically 
be justified in using it and would be immune from liability.255  As a 
result, the sole inquiry would be to determine whether a school shooting 
was in progress.  If the shooting ended, the need for deadly force would 
not exist; however, if the shooter was still active, the officers would be 
allowed to take all necessary actions to stop him. 
Even though such a rule may lead to abuse of power and excessive 
force, the utilitarian ideal would outweigh any shooter’s rights.  This 
reasoning is similar to Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Scott, where the Court 
took into account not only the dangerousness posed by the suspect, but 
also the culpability of the suspect in relation to the innocence of potential 
victims.256  Consequently, Scott suggests that the Court will eliminate the 
reasonableness test and create bright-line rules in certain situations.257  A 
school shooting is an example of such a situation where a bright-line 
                                                 
252 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing police department’s commitment 
to deter and prevent school shootings through new police tactics). 
253 See infra Part IV.B (discussing the creation of an exception for school shootings). 
254 See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing the background and standards of the reasonableness 
test); supra note 210 and accompanying text (discussing four factors officers should 
consider when determining reasonableness). 
255  See infra notes 256–71 and accompanying text (discussing proposal). 
256 See supra notes 102–13 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Scalia’s majority 
opinion in Scott v. Harris and the addition of a dangerousness requirement which also 
considers culpability); supra Part III.B.1 (analyzing Scott v. Harris with the reasonableness 
test created in Tennessee v. Garner and Graham v. Connor). 
257 See supra notes 199–206 and accompanying text (analyzing Scott v. Harris and creating 
bright-line rules in some instances). 
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standard should be created.  Doing so, will reduce school violence, 
bridge the gap between the Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and officer training, and provide benefits to officers and courts. 
Establishing a bright-line rule will reduce school violence by creating 
a strong deterrent.  If shooters know they will be killed in the course of 
their shooting, some shooters may decide to abandon their plan.  
Naturally, not all shooters will be deterred, but if one shooter is deterred 
and even one innocent life protected, then the rule will have achieved its 
objective.258  Even if no shooters are deterred, adopting this standard will 
re-align officer training and Supreme Court jurisprudence, which is 
better than the current status.259 
As noted earlier, a gap exists between officer training and Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence.260  By adopting this bright-line rule, the 
Court will accommodate its reasonableness test and officers will be 
allowed to use whatever force is necessary to stop the suspect from 
committing the crime, which is the same standard police officers are 
currently using to stop school shootings.261  As a result, the gap will be 
bridged and the chance of officer liability reduced substantially.  Though 
immunity is important, there are many other benefits to officers as well. 
Perhaps the most important benefit is allowing officers to react 
instinctively and quickly to the constantly changing environment, rather 
than forcing them to justify their actions prior to acting and risk 
indecision or hesitation.262  In a chaotic deadly situation such as a school 
shooting, the worst action an officer can take is to hesitate or decide not 
to act.  This jeopardizes their lives and also the lives of innocent people 
caught in the crossfire. 
Additionally, adopting a bright-line rule eliminates the requirement 
that officers constantly reassess the situation.  Instead, officers only need 
to know whether the shooter is still active.  If he is, officers know deadly 
force is justifiable and can neutralize him; if not, officers know deadly 
force is inappropriate.  It is an easy “on/off switch,” which differs from 
Garner.263  Moreover, it allows officers to make reasonable and rational 
                                                 
258 See supra note 155 and accompanying text (discussing perpetrator’s claim that medical 
detectors would not have been enough). 
259 See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text (discussing the gap between the Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness test and officer tactics). 
260 See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text (discussing the gap and extent to which 
it has reached). 
261 See supra Part II.C.2 (discussing the current police policies and tactics to reduce school 
shootings). 
262 See supra note 211 and accompanying text (discussing the risk of indecision and 
hesitation). 
263 See supra note 189 and accompanying text (discussing the on/off switch avoided in 
Tennessee v. Garner). 
Pratt: The Fourth Amendment's Shortcomings for Police During School Shoo
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2010
1148 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44 
decisions because they can focus on eliminating the risk, rather than 
reassessing the situation.264 
Finally, establishing this standard will create uniform police action 
by reducing differing individual standards of reasonableness.265  This 
cures potential differences between the 6’5” officer and the 5’10” officer 
in the above illustration.266  As a result co-officers can better predict each 
other’s actions and provide safer conditions for themselves and innocent 
bystanders.267  Although officers reap many benefits, courts also benefit 
from an easier standard. 
For courts, adopting the common law standard allows application of 
more uniform and consistent standards.268  This also eliminates 
confusion for officers because the standards applied by the courts would 
be consistent.269  As a result, officers will act reasonably and reduce the 
chance of accidental injuries because, rather than reassessing 
reasonableness, officers can think and act quickly and clearly.270  
Consequently, both courts and officers benefit from adopting the 
common law standard. 
If both proposals are implemented, students like Billy would either 
abandon their plans or be prematurely stopped by police.  Either way, 
lives are saved. 
With mandatory preventive measures, Billy may have decided to 
forego his plans because he would have seen the difficulty of entering 
school while possessing a firearm.  Moreover, if he still attempted to 
enter, officers could immediately stop him.  Consequently, the lives of 
nearly fifty individuals would have been saved, including his own, 
which now will be spent in prison. 
Alternatively, if Billy was able to evade the preventative measures 
and begin shooting, the lives lost would be substantially reduced 
because rather than establish a perimeter and wait for the S.WA.T. team, 
officers could have entered the school and stopped Billy with any force 
                                                 
264 See supra notes 209–20 and accompanying text (discussing problems reassessments 
cause police officers). 
265 See supra notes 222–26 and accompanying text (discussing problems posed by 
individual reasonableness standards). 
266 See supra notes 222–24 and accompanying text (comparing one police officer’s 
reasonableness standards to another). 
267 See supra notes 211, 225 and accompanying text (discussing police officer safety and 
the teamwork required to execute new police tactics). 
268 See supra Parts II.B.3, III.B.3 (discussing problems lower courts have encountered 
when applying the reasonableness test). 
269 See supra notes 230–33 and accompanying text (discussing how inconsistent court 
standards could mislead police departments). 
270 See supra 233 and accompanying text (discussing how consistent standards will reduce 
accidental injury and death). 
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necessary.  While officers could have done this volitionally, they would 
have been exposed to liability and would have to comply with the 
Fourth Amendment reasonableness test.  This could lead to the potential 
problems illustrated above.271  By adopting this second proposal, police 
officers are saved from the problems posed by the reasonableness test, 
are protected from liability, and numerous lives are saved because Billy 
would have only had minutes to execute his plan, rather than an hour.  
Therefore, it would not have been impossible for Billy to kill some 
students, but by implementing the proposals, the number of lives lost 
and the chance of liability for officers would have been substantially 
reduced. 
V.  CONCLUSION  
Despite numerous attempts by schools and legislatures to curb 
school violence, the plague continues.  The central problem with these 
previous attempts is the discretion given to officials.  Preventative 
measures and financial assistance can help, but solely relying upon 
optional programs has been inadequate.  As a result, police departments 
have revamped their active shooter procedures. 
It was not until recently that police departments recognized the need 
to change active shooter policies and take a proactive stance by granting 
officers greater latitude regarding the use of force.  While police 
departments altered procedures, legislatures and courts have not 
changed the reasonableness test to protect officers from liability.  As a 
result, a growing gap exists between officers training and how courts 
expect officers to react.  To bridge the gap, a bright-line rule must be 
adopted. 
Taken together, both proposals will reduce school violence by 
deterring weak and strong-willed shooters.  It is not a fool-proof 
solution, but absolute security does not exist.  The best thing to hope for 
is that the next time Billy visits Wilson High School; he will abandon his 
plans because police officers will be stalking the halls. 
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271 See supra Part III.B (discussing the problems associated with reasonableness tests and 
school shootings). 
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